Unraveling the Mystery of \u3cem\u3eWilko v. Swan\u3c/em\u3e: American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party Autonomy by Gaitis, James M.
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
Volume 7 | Issue 1 Article 1
12-1-2006
Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: American
Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental
Demise of Party Autonomy
James M. Gaitis
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Dispute
Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal
Remedies Commons, Litigation Commons, Other Law Commons, and the Securities Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
josias.bartram@pepperdine.edu , anna.speth@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Gaitis, Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v. Swan: American Arbitration Vacatur Law and the Accidental Demise of Party Autonomy
, 7 Pepp. Disp. Resol. L.J. Iss. 1 (2006)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss1/1
[Vol. 7: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
Unraveling the Mystery of Wilko v.
Swan: American Arbitration Vacatur
Law and the Accidental Demise of
Party Autonomy
James M. Gaitis*
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 2
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WILKO OPINION AND ITS
APPLICATION BY LOWER COURTS ....................................................... 7
A. What W ilko Actually Says ........................................................ 7
B. The Spontaneous Generation of the Doctrine of Manifest
D isregard of the Law .................................................................. 11
III. TRADITIONAL AMERICAN VACATUR LAW PERTAINING
TO ERRORS IN THE APPLICATION OF LAW .......................................... 16
A. Kleine v. Catara-The Implications of Restricted and Unre-
stricted Subm issions ................................................................. 17
B. Burchell v. Marsh- "Gross Mistake" vs. "Error of Judg-
m en t .......................................................................................... 24
C. State Court Decisions in the Immediate Wake of Burchell .......... 27
D. United States v. Farragut- "Note the Right ofReview" ............ 31
E. Prelude to the FAA .................................................................. 36
IV. THE HISTORY AND ENACTMENT OF THE FAA ................................... 38
A. The Legislative History of the FAA ......................................... 38
B. The Origins of Section 10 of the FAA .................................... 43
C. Confusing Policy Objectives with Fortuitous Impacts ........ 46
D. On the Eve of W ilko v. Swan ................................................. 49
V. REEXAMINING THE WILKO OPINION ................................................... 54
A. The Meaning of "Disregard". ............................................... 54
B. The Distinction Between Error in Interpretation and Mani-
fest D isregard .......................................................................... 57
C. Confusing Unrestricted and Restricted Submissions ............... 58
VI. REVITALIZING PARTY AUTONOMY ........................................................ 61
1
Gaitis: Unraveling the Mystery of <em>Wilko v. Swan</em>: American Arbitr
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2006
I. INTRODUCTION
For American arbitration practitioners and scholars, no greater mystery
exists than the question of the origins and intended meaning of the United
States Supreme Court's famous utterance in its 1953 decision in Wilko v.
Swan I that "[i]n unrestricted submission.., the interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation." 2 Despite the fact that
there is nothing in the Wilko decision suggesting the Court intended to estab-
lish an exception to either the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA'")3 or the
law upon which it was based, the Court's use of the phrase "manifest disre-
gard" has nevertheless gradually transmuted into an accepted legal doctrine
under which the FAA's policy favoring party autonomy has been subverted
in favor of other, more amorphous objectives.4 In essence, and despite the
total absence of a legislative or judicial declaration that public policy does,
or should, forbid parties from agreeing that arbitrators shall correctly apply
the law in resolving the parties' dispute, courts now consistently hold that
such an arbitration provision is unenforceable under the FAA.5 In accord
* Fellow, College of Commercial Arbitrators; Fellow and Chartered Arbitrator, Chartered Institute
of Arbitrators; Honorary Lecturer, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, Uni-
versity of Dundee, Scotland, UK; B.A. University of Notre Dame; J.D., University of Iowa.
346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). The issues addressed in this article do not relate solely to domestic
American arbitration. Because the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000),
applies to international arbitrations conducted in the United States, the issues addressed here should
be of equal importance to parties interested in international arbitration and so-called nondomestic
arbitrations conducted in the United States. For a discussion of the applicability of the FAA and
American vacatur law to international arbitrations conducted in the United States, see James M.
Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Providing a Limited
Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 52-62
(2004).
2 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
39 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
4 See infra notes 290-93.
5 Of course, most parties do not expressly state in their arbitration provision that the arbitrators are
obligated to "correctly" apply the law identified as governing the parties' dispute. Nonetheless, it is
nonsensical that in such an instance the parties do not have a contractual expectation that their rights
will be determined by a correct application of the law. As will be shown throughout this article, the
traditional American arbitration vacatur law relied upon by the Wilko Court clearly provided that
when the parties provide that the arbitrators shall apply a particular law in determining their rights, a
reviewing court will understand not only that the parties did expect that such law would be applied
correctly but, also, that manifest errors in the application of that law can justify the vacatur of the
award. Interestingly, at least one court has expressly acknowledged that when the parties do ex-
pressly state that the arbitrators shall "correctly" apply the chosen law and the arbitrator then fails to
correctly apply that law, the arbitrator has acted "in excess" of arbitral authority such that the award
is subject to vacatur. See Keyclick Outsourcing, Inc. v. Ochsner Health Plan, Inc., 2006 WL
3094077, No. 06-CA-359, *1-2 (La. App. Oct. 31. 2006) (involving an arbitration agreement that
2
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with the manifest disregard doctrine, state and federal courts now routinely
declare that arbitral awards infected by patently obvious errors in the appli-
cation of clearly established substantive law are not subject to vacatur unless
the arbitral tribunal was aware of and understood the law and then intention-
ally elected not to apply it.
6
Given the significance of the manifest disregard of the law doctrine, it
seems odd that the doctrine itself was bred out of a regrettable cascade of
events that began with the Supreme Court both misstating and rephrasing the
operation of established arbitration vacatur law, and concluded with every
federal circuit, 7 and many state courts, 8 adopting an interpretation of the
Wilko decision that has no valid basis in law or theory.9 Interestingly, the
errors in legal analysis respectively committed first by the Supreme Court
and then by the federal courts not only differ in highly significant ways but
also came about for entirely different reasons. The only material error in the
Supreme Court's analysis was occasioned by a seemingly inadvertent mis-
characterization of a single aspect of traditional American arbitration vacatur
law, whereas the errors in the reasoning of subsequent federal appellate
court decisions, and in the rationale for the "doctrine" of manifest disregard
provided that "[tihe arbitrator shall have no authority to make material errors of law" and holding
that, in light of the parties' arbitration agreement, a material error of law constituted an act in excess
of arbitral authority that warranted the vacatur of the award).
6 See, e.g., Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 932 (10th Cir. 2001); Hoffman v. Cargill
Inc., 236 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2001); Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234,
240 (1st Cir. 1995); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir.
1995).
7 For a list of "representative cases" showing that every federal circuit has now recognized some
form of the manifest disregard doctrine, see Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49
(Ala. 2004). See also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 764-79 (1996) (providing a survey of manifest
disregard cases through 1996).
8 See, e.g., Birmingham News Co., 901 So. 2d at 50 (adopting the manifest disregard of the law doc-
trine and listing eleven other states that had already done so). It is significant to note that the federal
manifest disregard of the law doctrine can apply in a state court proceeding even when the state has
not adopted the standard. See, e.g., Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 N.Y.3d 471, 480
(2006). The threshold question for the state court in a confirmation or vacatur proceeding relating to
an arbitration award covered by the FAA is whether, under that state's laws, federal vacatur stan-
dards are viewed as being procedural or substantive in nature. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. V. Dob-
son, 513 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1995). As a consequence, while some state courts consider themselves
to be bound to apply the federal vacatur law in a state court proceeding concerning the confirmation
or vacatur of an arbitration award covered by the FAA, others do not. See generally James M.
Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and
Partial Final Awards in Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 1, 77-82
(2005).
' See infra Parts III-V.
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of the law as we know it, result from an unduly dogmatic analysis in which
the normal investigative tools of historical inquiry and case law considera-
tion were neglected in favor of the peremptory application of a nonexistent
policy. 10 It is therefore the case that for more than a half century following
the issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko, no court or commen-
tator has undertaken the task of dissecting the language of Wilko and of ana-
lyzing that language in light of the legislative history of the FAA and the
substantial body of case law that existed at the time Wilko was decided.1
Remarkably, such an analysis strongly suggests that under the case law
the Wilko Court attempted to apply, courts do have, or at least should have,
the authority in some circumstances to vacate arbitral awards that are clearly
based on faulty legal reasoning. 12 More specifically, a proper construction of
Wilko, the FAA, and previously existing law lends strong support to four
specific legal conclusions that will seem extraordinary, if not outlandish, to
American arbitration practitioners and scholars. 13  First, and contrary to
popular opinion, 14 it was not Congress' intent in passing the FAA to impose
greater limits on judicial review of arbitral awards than those that existed
under traditional vacatur law. 15 Second, and contrary to the general thrust of
'o See infra Parts III-V.
1 One recent scholarly article has addressed the lack of legal foundation for the manifest disregard
doctrine. See Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J.
547 (2006). The author's analysis, however, only summarily discusses the authorities cited by the
Wilko Court and essentially disregards the legislative history of the FAA. See id. at 584-89. In es-
sence, the author concludes that a refined version of the manifest disregard of the law doctrine
should apply, but only in instances in which the arbitrators are legally required to apply mandatory
or other "nonwaivable" law. See id. 606-07. The author, therefore, does not discuss the central issue
of this article-i.e., whether the Wilko Court meant to apply traditional arbitration vacatur law and,
more importantly, whether prevailing principles relating to party autonomy and the associated intent
of the FAA dictate that the same vacatur law should apply to contemporary arbitrations governed by
the FAA. Nevertheless, the instant article does not dispute Professor Scodro's conclusion that the
application of mandatory law may not be waived via a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. See id.
12 See infra Parts III-IV.
13 Many American arbitration practitioners fail to realize that a variety of countries, including Eng-
land, do permit merit-based review of arbitral awards. For a discussion of the arbitration laws of
various countries, including England, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Belgium, that permit varying
degrees of merit-based review, see WILLIAM W. PARK, Procedural Evolution in Business Arbitra-
tion. Three Studies in Change 11-12, reprinted from ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
DISPUTES: STUDIES IN LAW AND PRACTICE (2006). Notably, the laws of those nations are based on
the premise that principles of party autonomy dictate that awards must be subject to review for legal
error to ensure that the contracting parties' expectations are fulfilled. See, e.g., Fraser Davidson, The
New Arbitration Act-A Model Law? 1997 J. BUS. LAW 101, 125 (quoting representatives of the
United Kingdom who participated in the drafting of the UNCITRAL Model Law as stating that "the
logical consequence of party autonomy is that they should be allowed to have recourse, if that is
what they have agreed").
14 See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
" See infra Part IV.A-B.
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the Wilko "manifest disregard" statement, under "unrestricted" arbitration
submissions, arbitrators should be deemed to be authorized to intentionally
disregard applicable law should they so choose. 16 Third, when arbitrators
acting under an unrestricted submission intend to base their award on appli-
cable law, the resulting award should be subject to vacatur if it is clearly es-
tablished that the arbitrators committed error in the application of that law. 17
Finally, under the same rationale as applied to the third principle stated
above, when the arbitration proceeding is governed by a "restricted" submis-
sion that explicitly requires the arbitrators to apply a particular law, or im-
plicitly requires the application of a mandatory law, the resulting award
should be subject to vacatur when it can be clearly shown that the arbitrator
failed to properly apply that law or materially erred in applying clearly es-
tablished law. 18
Despite the fact that the arbitration laws of some developed nations rec-
ognize these same principles, 19 they no doubt will seem repugnant to an
American arbitration community and judiciary that have vigorously sought
to severely limit judicial review of arbitral awards based on an ideology that
places paramount importance on considerations of "efficiency" and "final-
ity." It must nonetheless be recognized that the above-stated propositions
not only emanate from an exceedingly substantial body of case law-which
the Wilko Court clearly meant to endorse-but also are utterly consistent
with controlling policy considerations relating to party autonomy. More-
over, although the point will surely be contested, there is nothing in the his-
tory of the FAA, or in the FAA itself, that suggests these time-honored prin-
ciples should suddenly and radically be abolished by the enactment of the
'6 Again, this proviso is subject to the limitation proposed by Professor Scodro and others that man-
datory law cannot be waived in a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. See generally Scodro, supra
note 11; Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 83 MINN. L. REv. 703, 737 (1999) (acknowledging the plausibility of the argument "that FAA
section 10(a)(4) authorizes courts to vacate awards where the arbitrators exceeded their powers and
arbitrators do not have the power to decide disputes without applying mandatory law"). Examples of
contracts (or claims) that inherently require the application of certain law include those contracts or
claims regarding securities transactions, restraint of trade, or employment. Laws relating to such
contracts or claims are mandatory because their enforcement is intended to protect public, rather
than private, interests. The "public policy" exception to both the confirmation of arbitral awards and
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is ingrained in arbitration law. See gen-
erally, Gaitis, supra note 1, at 47-48, 71-76.
17 See infra Parts IIl-IV.
"8 See infra Parts II-V.
19 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
20 see id.
5
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FAA, which, after all, was intended to enforce party autonomy and private
agreements to arbitrate rather than thwart them. 2 P
This article conducts an analysis of these issues, commencing with a
brief description of what the Wilko Court actually said with respect to the
vacatur of arbitral awards and how federal and state appellate courts have
22 23
construed that language. Traditional American arbitration vacatur law,
including but not limited to the cases relied upon by the Wilko Court, are
then reviewed in depth such that the Wilko decision and the Wilko Court's
24
choice of language may be placed in context and fully examined. The in-
tent and proper operation of the FAA are then discussed based on both the
legislative history of the FAA and other authorities that consistently recog-
nize the fundamental objective of the FAA is to enforce private agreements
to resolve civil disputes through arbitration processes. 25 Next, the Wilko de-
cision is reconsidered in light of traditional vacatur law and the intent of the
FAA. The clearly discemable manner in which the Wilko Court modestly
strayed, no doubt inadvertently, from that law is highlighted and the errone-
ous foundation for the contemporary doctrine of manifest disregard of the
law, as applied by every federal circuit, is thereby exposed. Finally, the arti-
cle concludes by briefly discussing the contemporary issues that implicate
principles of party autonomy in connection with the review and finality of
arbitral awards. This paper emphasizes that until such time as Wilko is re-
considered, and principles of party autonomy are resurrected under the FAA,
the objective of the enforcement of party autonomy will never be realized.
2 See infra Part IV.
22 See infra Part II.A.
23 The phrase "traditional American arbitration vacatur law" is used in this article to refer to the most
commonly accepted approach to merits-based review of arbitral awards during the nineteenth and
the first half of the twentieth centuries. The use of the phrase is not intended to suggest that the
various states of the United States have always been in agreement as to the manner in which the law
should operate in this regard. To the contrary, in-depth legal research reveals that there has always
been a great diversity of opinion on the topic. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text. Nev-
ertheless, an examination of the case law reflects not only that the most thoroughly reasoned deci-
sions consistently permitted the vacatur of arbitral awards based on a manifest mistake in the appli-
cation of law but, also, and more importantly, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
principle with reasonable consistency. See infra Part III.A-D. Given the imprimatur of the Supreme
Court in this regard, and because this article pertains specifically to federal arbitration law, those
cases, as a whole, are deemed here to reflect legal principles that embodied traditional and generally
accepted law.
24 See infra Part III.A-D.
25 See infra Part III.E.
6
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE WILKO OPINION AND ITS APPLICATION BY LOWER
COURTS
A. What Wilko Actually Says
Given that every court that has attempted to apply the Wilko Court's ob-
servations regarding manifest disregard of the law has failed to fully analyze
the Supreme Court's language and the historical context that preceded
Wilko, it is not particularly surprising that those courts often have quoted
only isolated or incomplete portions of Wilko in applying what they per-
ceived to be the law. As is frequently the case, those aspects of the Wilko
opinion that have been neglected by courts are, in many ways, more reveal-
ing than the truncated excerpts from Wilko that are most typically men-
tioned. An initial review of what the Supreme Court said in its Wilko deci-
sion is therefore helpful in connection with both the analytical
deconstruction of Wilko based on a historical legal analysis and an examina-
tion of subsequent attempts to apply Wilko.
Any review of Wilko should begin by acknowledging that in granting
certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in Wilko v. Swan,26 the United States Supreme Court did not specifically
agree to resolve a dispute regarding the correct application of vacatur law
27
under the FAA.. Wilko involved an appeal from a district court order deny
ing a motion to compel arbitration;28 consequently, neither of the parties nor
amicus curiae-the Securities and Exchange Commission --suggested that
there was an issue regarding what judicial standards of review apply once an
arbitral award is issued. The much narrower issue in Wilko involved the
question of whether an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy arising
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 193330 (the "Securities Act" or
the "Act") was violative of section 14 of the Act, which prohibited prospec-
tive waivers of the protections the Act was designed to guarantee. 3 1 That is
not to say, however, that questions concerning the correct application of fed-
eral arbitration vacatur law were not relevant to the Court's analysis of the
26 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953).
27 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 (noting that the issue was "whether an agreement to arbitrate a future
controversy is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with the provision' of the Securities Act which s[ection] 14 declares 'void').
28 See Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
29 See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427-28.
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
"' See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
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waiver issue. Such questions presumably were of particular importance both
to the Court and to the Second Circuit in its decision below because if courts
generally maintained authority to review the legal reasoning underlying an
arbitral award, the arbitration of securities claims arguably would not result
in a waiver of the legal protections guaranteed by the Securities Act.
32
When the Second Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the
motion to compel arbitration and held that the arbitration agreement did not
constitute a waiver under the Securities Act, an important element of the
Second Circuit's reasoning involved its determination that courts did have
the authority to review the legal reasoning in arbitral awards when the perti-
nent arbitration agreement required the arbitral tribunal to decide issues in
accordance with a particular law:
[W]hile it may be true that arbitrators do not ordinarily
consider themselves bound to decide strictly according to
legal rules, there can be no doubt that they are so bound if
the arbitration agreement so provides. Undoubtedly it is
true in this country, as said in American Almond Prod. Co.
v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 2 Cir., 144 F.2d 448, 451,
154 A.L.R. 1205, when parties have adopted arbitration,
ordinarily "they must content themselves with looser ap-
proximations to the enforcement of their rights than those
that the law accord them, when they resort to its machin-
ery." But, as previously noted, the agreement in the case at
bar is "subject to" the 1933 Act; consequently the arbitra-
tors are bound to decide in accordance with the provisions
of Section 12(2). Failure to do so would, in our opinion,
32 Many courts at one time or another have consciously or subconsciously attempted to minimize the
significance of the Wilko Court's manifest disregard language through the simple artifice of charac-
terizing that language as "dicta." See, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.
Co., 551 F.2d 136, 143 n.9 (7th Cir. 1977); Chapman v. Se. Region I.L.G.W.U. Health & Welfare
Recreation Fund, 280 F. Supp. 766, 770 (D.C.S.C. 1968). These characterizations fail, however, to
distinguish between "obiter dicta" and "judicial dicta." See Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Au-
thority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication: An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 655, 712-13 (1999). Obiter dictum--otherwise known as mere dictum-is noth-
ing more than a passing opinion, the persuasiveness of which is debatable. Id. at 713. In contrast,
judicial dictum can be of much greater significance because it reflects a "court's reasoned considera-
tion and elaboration upon a legal norm." Id. at 713-14. The Supreme Court thus recognizes that
judicial dictum can essentially have precedential effect when it reiterates "well-established rationale
upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions." See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 67 (1966). More importantly, and as the Court has observed, "principle[s] of stare decisis
[require courts, including the Supreme Court] to adhere not only to the holdings of... prior cases,
but also to... explications of the governing rules of law." County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 668 (1989). To the extent that the Wilko Court's discussion of traditional vacatur law and its
manifest disregard language was mere dictum, it was clearly judicial dictum both because the dis-
cussion was essential to the Court's reasoning and because that reasoning was based, in part, on ear-
lier decisions by the Court. The fact that the discussion in Wilko might have been judicial dictum,
therefore, does not detract from its significance.
8
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constitute groundso3 vacating the award pursuant to sec-
tion 10 of the [FAA].
It is particularly noteworthy that on writ of certiorari to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, the respondent and the Supreme Court ex-
pressly refrained from disagreeing with the court of appeal's observation in
this regard. The seeming unanimity between the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, the respondent, and the Wilko majority on this point shows
that neither the courts nor the parties that were involved in Wilko were advo-
cating the creation of an exception to existing, known vacatur law under ei-
ther the FAA or the common law decisions on which the FAA was based.35
Ultimately, the Wilko majority determined that a complainant's rights
under the Securities Act could be impaired, and thus waived, under an arbi-
tration agreement for a variety of reasons, including the fact that under both
the FAA and traditional American arbitration law, judicial review of arbitral
awards was more limited than that permitted with respect to district court
36judgments. The Court's reasoning consequently includes what purports to
be an explication of the law pertaining to vacatur of arbitral awards that are
founded on erroneous legal reasoning; and it is here that the manifest disre-
gard language, together with several important hints as to its meaning, is to
be found:
As their award may be made without explanation of their
reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,
the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such
statutory requirements as "burden of proof," "reasonable
care" or "material fact,"... cannot be examined. Power to
vacate an award is limited. While it may be true, as the
Court of Appeals thought, that a failure of the arbitrators
to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securi-
ties Act would "constitute grounds for vacating the award
pursuant to section 10 of the [FAA]," that failure would
"3 Wilko, 201 F.2d at 444-45 (footnote citations omitted) (emphasis added).
' Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-34. It is interesting to note that this phraseology has been all but ignored
by courts and commentators despite the fact that thefe would seem to be an obvious difference be-
tween simply attempting to apply a law and deciding "in accordance" with the law. Although a la-
bored analysis that focuses on the meaning of the phrase "in accordance" and cites cases discussing
whether a decision was "in accordance with the law" would be too rudimentary, it should at least be
observed that contemporary jurisprudence regarding the application of the doctrine of manifest dis-
regard of the law and section 10 of the FAA does not require that arbitral decisions be in accord with
the law and, instead, merely requires arbitrators to attempt to apply the law when they realize the law
exists and is applicable to the issues before them.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 434-38.
9
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need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submis-
sion, such as the present margin agreements envisage, the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to
manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation. The [FAA] con-
tains no provision for judicial dtermination of legal issues
such as is found in English law.
The above-quoted statement in Wilko was supported by reasonably ex-
tensive footnotes. 38 For example, in observing that the "[p]ower to vacate
an award is limited," the Court cited and quoted the entirety of section 10 of
the FAA.39 Similarly, in the lengthy statement that contained not only the
infamous manifest disregard language but also the qualifying phrase "[i]n
unrestricted submission," the Court cited a long series of authorities that in-
cluded several important cases, including Justice Story's 1814 opinion in
Kleine v. Catara 4 and the Supreme Court's 1874 decision in United States
v. Farragut,4 1 as well as an equally interesting student law review note.
42
As shown below, the Court's reasoning and the support it provided therefore
were not merely the idle ramblings of obiter dicta; they provide essential
clues as to the state of the law at the time Wilko was decided and of the
meaning of the language employed by the Court in deciding the issues at
hand.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter, in which Justice Minton
joined, also warrants brief mention at this stage of the analysis. 43 The dis-
senting opinion generally agrees with the explanation of applicable vacatur
" Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Any thought that the Court's ref-
erence to "English law" aids in gaining an understanding of "manifest disregard" is easily dispelled
by an examination of section 21 of the English Arbitration Act 1950 [hereinafter the "English Act"],
which the Court cited in connection with its reference to English law. See id. at 437 n.25. Section
21 provided for a "stated case procedure" where "either party could apply to the arbitrator to state a
special case to the High Court for an order compelling the arbitrator to state the case [in order] to
ensure that arbitrators properly applied the law in arbitration proceedings." Okezie Chukwumerije,
Reform and Consolidation of English Arbitration Law, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 21, 43 (1997). The
Wilko Court's observation that the FAA contains no such provision, thus, both reaffirms the Court's
earlier statement in the same paragraph that the ability of a court to review an award might be im-
paired because of the lack of "a complete record" and emphasizes that unlike the broad review per-
mitted at that time under the English Act, American vacatur law and the FAA provided for more
limited review. The former point was sufficiently critical to the majority's decision that Justice
Frankfurter, in dissent, argued that the FAA must be read to impliedly require "some [arbitral] re-
cord or opinion." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" See 346 U.S. at 346-47 n.22-25.
'9 Id. at 436 n.22.
40 Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869).
41 United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406 (1874).
42 Id. at 436-37 & n.24.
43 Id. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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law offered by both the court of appeals and the Wilko majority. 44 More im-
portantly, and as discussed in more detail later,4 5 Justice Frankfurter's use of
the word "disregard" in both his 1953 dissent in Wilko and a separate 1957
opinion helps to shed light on the likely meaning of that word in the Wilko
majority opinion:
Arbitrators may not disregard the law. Specifically they
are, as Chief Judge Swan pointed out, "bound to decide in
accordance with the provisions of section 12(2)." On this
we are all agreed. It is suggested, however, that there is no
effective way of assuring obedience by the arbitrators to the
governing law. But since their failure to observe the law
"would constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant
to section 10 of the FAA," appropriate means for judicial
scrutiny must be implied in the form of some record or
opinion, however informal, whereby suc 6 compliance will
appear, or want of it will upset the award.
This article ultimately shows that with the exception of Justice Jackson
who explicitly refrained from expressing an opinion on the issue, 47 every
member of the United States Supreme Court and the court of appeals below
was probably of the opinion that the FAA could be harmonized with previ-
ously existing vacatur law that under some circumstances permitted the va-
catur of arbitral awards based on errors in legal reasoning. Before embark-
ing on a critical analysis of the specific language employed by the Wilko
Court and the historical context in which that language was used, however, it
is further enlightening to generally highlight how the Wilko manifest disre-
gard language, under the rubric of the manifest disregard of the law doctrine,
is applied by contemporary courts.
B. The Spontaneous Generation of the Doctrine of Manifest Disregard
of the Law
It cannot be said that subsequent judicial interpretations of Wilko
evolved through a deliberate process whereby the doctrine of manifest disre-
gard of the law was gradually refined and perfected. Instead, the doctrine
appears to have originated in a single federal appellate court decision that
steadily gained acceptance by every federal circuit and by the highest appel-
44 Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45 See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
46 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
47 Id. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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48late courts of many states. Yet the generally accepted interpretation of
Wilko cannot be characterized as obvious. The first federal district courts to
cite Wilko as providing guidance with respect to the law relating to the vaca-
tur of arbitral awards, thus, either avoided suggesting that Wilko altered or
embellished previously existing law 49 or cautiously and very generally at-
tempted to reconcile Wilko with existing arbitration law. 50 It might be ar-
gued that those federal district courts were not particularly concerned with
the quality or validity of the legal reasoning contained in the arbitral awards
under review and that they, therefore, had no particular reason to interpret
the Wilko manifest disregard language further. Be that as it may, and given
the inevitability of the occurrence of occasional arbitral errors in legal rea-
soning, 5 1 it was only a matter of time before a federal appellate court would
be motivated to determine whether the Wilko Court's observations regarding
manifest disregard merely constituted another way to describe previously
established law or alternatively, either broadened or narrowed the grounds
on which an arbitral award could be vacated.
That time came less than a decade after the issuance of the Wilko deci-
sion when, in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Ter-
minals Ltd.,52 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed clear
doubts relating to the validity of the legal reasoning underlying an award.
Under these circumstances, the court presumably felt compelled to explain
the legal limitations on the authority of federal courts to vacate arbitral
48 Birmingham News Co., 901 So. 2d at 48-50.
49 See Dulien Steel Prods. Inc. v. Ogeka, 147 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Wash. 1956) (quoting the mani-
fest disregard language of Wilko and citing that language as supporting of the general proposition
that "there should be a great hesitation in upsetting an arbitral award").
50 See Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 857 (D.S.C. 1957) (observing that
"[t]he statutory grounds for vacating an award, 9 U.S.C. § 10, are substantially the same as those at
common law").
51 See, e.g., Gaitis, supra note I passim (discussing the periodic occurrence of factual and legal er-
rors in the reasoning of reasoned awards and arguing in favor of granting arbitrators the limited op-
portunity to remedy such errors); Hans Smit, Correcting Arbitral Mistakes, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
225, 228 (2001) ("[rlegrettably, but understandably, arbitrators sometimes make mistakes"); William
H. Knull III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is it Time to Offer an
Appeal Option, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531, 541 (2000) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that arbi-
trators are any less fallible than judges.").
52 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961). The district court had modified the award based on the finding that
certain damages findings in the award were "not in accordance with law and beyond the scope of the
arbitrators' authority." Id. at 798. The appellate court, thus, ruled that an error in the application of
law is tantamount to an arbitral act in excess of authority, one of the enumerated grounds for vacat-
ing an award under section 10 of the FAA. For a further discussion of the interrelationship of this
statutory ground for vacating an award and manifest disregard doctrine, see infra notes 95-101, 199-
211, 249, 278 and accompanying text.
53 Id. at 801 (observing that "it may well be that the arbitrators' view of the law was questionable"
and that "the arbitrators may have been mistaken in the view of the law respecting abuse of proc-
ess").
12
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awards and, having elected to provide such an explanation, was immediately
confronted with the Wilko decision.
54
Unfortunately, in its effort to divine the meaning of Wilko, the San Mar-
tine court did not attempt to reconcile Wilko with the FAA, despite the fact
that the FAA had already been in existence for more than a quarter cen-
tury.55 Nor did the San Martine court carefully examine all, or even most,
of the cases and other authorities cited by the Wilko majority. 56 Instead, the
reasoning of the San Martine decision relating to the meaning of the Wilko
manifest disregard language appears to be based on the unfounded premise
that Wilko somehow contradicted, or at least was not entirely consistent
with, a single 1854 United States Supreme Court case-Burchell v.
Marsh V7-that the Wilko Court had in fact cited and in which the Burchell
Court, in part, had generally observed that "an award... within the terms of
the submission.. . will not be set aside by a court for error either in law or
fact." 58 Had the court of appeals examined the issue more deeply, it would
have realized that in one respect, the manifest disregard language in Wilko
essentially amplifies the principle stated in Burchell and, more significantly,
is consistent with a long line of cases that came into existence before and af-
ter the Burchell decision, some of which had been cited by the Wilko Court.
As if to demonstrate that the basic principle mentioned in Burchell does not
admit of further analysis or explanation, the Ninth Circuit simply endorsed
its truncated quotation of Burchell and then observed that sections 10 and 11
of the FAA "do not authorize [the] setting aside [of an award] on the
grounds of erroneous finding of fact or of misinterpretation of law."59 As is
discussed in more detail later, these observations were correct only to the ex-
tent that they reflected the proper starting point of an analysis regarding the
then-existing law concerning the vacatur of arbitral awards.
A complete analysis of the existing law would have reflected that the
Wilko majority had attempted to reconcile traditional American vacatur law
with the FAA, but failed because the Court for some reason had confused
one term of art and, furthermore, had utilized a phrase that differed slightly
54 1d.
55 San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801.
56 id.
s7 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
58 Wilko, 293 F.2d at 800.
'9 San Martine, 293 F.2d. at 800 (quoting Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate and Iodine Sales
Corp., 274 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843 (1960)).
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from phraseology that had been used by other courts in the past. 60 As a re-
sult of its incomplete analysis, the Ninth Circuit was left with no other re-
course than to presume that the manifest disregard language of Wilko re-
flected a new and ambiguous refinement of arbitration vacatur law. The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, complained that the Wilko Court "did not undertake
to define what it meant by 'manifest disregard' or indicate where the line
would be drawn between a case of 'manifest disregard' and a case of error in
interpretation of the law." 61 Having failed to recognize that the answers to
these questions were provided by the very cases that had been cited by the
Wilko majority, the court of appeals then further derided the Wilko decision
in a lengthy textual footnote and purported to explain why what it perceived
to be the most literal interpretation of Wilko was highly problematic:
Frankly, the Supreme Court's use of the words "manifest
disregard", has caused us trouble here. Conceivably the
words may have been used to indicate that whether an
award may be set aside for errors of law would be a ques-
tion of degree. Thus if the award was based on a mistaken
view of the law, but in their assumption of what the law
was, the arbitrators had not gone too far afield, then, the
award would stand; but if the error is an egregious one,
such as no sensible layman would be guilty of, then the
award could be set aside. Such a "degree of error" test
would, we think, be most difficult to apply. Results would
likely vary from judge to judge. We believe this is not what
the cowrt had in mind when it spoke of "manifest disre-
gard."
From these observations, the court of appeals in San Martine concluded
that "manifest disregard of the law must be something beyond and different
from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to under-
stand or apply the law." 63 The court thus pursued other analytical avenues
in search of an answer to the Wilko puzzle, as the court saw it.
The Ninth Circuit somehow found that an analytical compromise of
sorts could be constructed out of two additional United States Supreme
Court decisions, both issued after Wilko. The San Martine court quoted the
first of these two Supreme Court decisions, Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.,64
as support for the same general principle that had also been acknowledged in
60 See infra Part V. Specifically, the Court (1) mistakenly characterized the parties' arbitration sub-
mission as "unrestricted" when it was clearly "restricted," and (2) altered traditional vacatur law
phraseology when it alluded to "manifest disregard" of the law, rather than to "manifest mistake" in
the application of law.
61 San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801.
62 Id. at n.4.
63 Id. at 801.
64 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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Burchell, noting that "[w]hether the arbitrators misconstrued a contract is not
open to judicial review." 65  The second Supreme Court decision, United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Corp.,66 which involved a labor arbitration, 67 was
then quoted by the court in San Martine for the far different proposition that
"[w]hen the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to [the essence of the
parties' contract], courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the
award."68  The Ninth Circuit apparently perceived that these two general
principles could be synthesized in a manner that allowed for a third principle
that fell between the harsh rule of the first, and the more lenient rule of the
second. Thus, by a process akin to triangulation, the manifest disregard of
the law doctrine, as we know it today, was born:
We apprehend that a manifest disregard of the law in the
context of the language used in Wilko v. Swan, supra, might be
present when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law,
but proceed to disregard same. We think this is the sort of thing
the Court had in mind in United Steelworkers ....
Similar manifest infidelity to what the arbitrators know to be
the law, but deliberately disregard might well be regarded as the
use of "undue means" within the meaning of subdivision (a) of 9
U.S.C. 10, or amouo to "partiality" within the meaning of sub-
division (b) thereof.
65 San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801 (quoting Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 198).
6' 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
67 Id. at 597.
68 San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801 (quoting United Steelworkers, 363 U.S at 593).
69 Id. (emphasis added). Some commentators have observed that other courts most frequently cite a
much later, 1986 opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as the authoritative source
for the contemporary manifest disregard doctrine. See, e.g., Scodro, supra note 11, at 571-72 (dis-
cussing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986), which
applied essentially the same standard as San Martine, and observing that "most courts follow Bob-
ker's lead and limit 'manifest disregard' to instances in which 'the law is totally clear, the arbitrator
understood the law, and chose to ignore it'); Bret F. Randall, Comment, The History, Application,
and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L.
REV. 759, 766 (referring to Bobker as "the most often cited formulation of the manifest disregard
standard"). Nevertheless, the trend toward adopting the reasoning of the San Martine decision dates
back to the early 1970s. See, e.g., Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir.
1972) (observing that the San Martine court struggled to interpret Wilko and stating that "if the arbi-
trators simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of a 'manifest disregard' standard
should presumably compel vacation of the award"). See also Upshur Coals Corp. v. UAW, Dist. 31,
933 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting San Martine); Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891,
893 (2d Cir. 1985) (observing that "[m]anifest disregard of the law may be found.., if the arbitrator
,understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it' (quoting Bell Aerospace Co. v.
Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1974))).
15
15
Gaitis: Unraveling the Mystery of <em>Wilko v. Swan</em>: American Arbitr
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2006
There is much that can be said of the San Martine decision and the
manner in which it illegitimately gave birth to the manifest disregard of the
law doctrine. And in light of the fact that the reasoning in San Martine and
the San Martine court's interpretation of the Wilko manifest disregard lan-
guage have now been adopted in one form or another by every federal circuit
and many state courts, much should be said and done about the so-called
doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. For the moment, it suffices to ob-
serve that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred substantially in its
reasoning in San Martine and in its ad hoc construction of the doctrine of
manifest disregard of the law. The nature of that error was to go unnoticed,
and remains undetected to this day, by every court and commentator that has
subsequently attempted to apply or understand the manifest disregard lan-
guage of the Wilko decision.
III. TRADITIONAL AMERICAN VACATUR LAW PERTAINING TO ERRORS IN
THE APPLICATION OF LAW
There should be no doubt that an understanding of traditional American
arbitration law is essential to gaining an understanding of the Wilko opinion.
The Wilko majority's observations relating to restricted submissions, mani-
fest disregard, and interpretations of the law or error in interpretation were
supported by a single lengthy footnote that contained cases dating back to
1814.71 These cases, when considered together with the Court's citation to
72section 10 of the FAA, indicate that the Court believed that the FAA did
not alter those aspects of the common law of arbitration pertaining to the va-
catur of awards due to the occurrence of legal error. An oblique parentheti-
cal in footnote 2473 and the reference to a student law review article 74 fur-
ther corroborate that conclusion. The subsequent interpretation of Wilko by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Martine, and the endorse-
ment by other courts of the San Martine court's version of the manifest dis-
regard doctrine, are often based, at least in part, on what is argued here to be
a misunderstanding of early cases addressing the vacatur of arbitral awards.
A review of traditional arbitration vacatur law is thus imperative in order to
determine (1) what the Wilko Court meant when it observed that "[i]n unre-
stricted submission ... the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in
70 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37.
7" Id. at n.24.7
1 Id. at 436&n.22.
73 Id. at 437 n.24 (citing United States v. Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406 (1874) and stating, "note
the right of review").
74 id.
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contrast to manifest disregard are not subject to judicial review for error,,75
and (2) to what extent, if any, legal considerations relating to restricted and
unrestricted submissions, and the policy favoring party autonomy, warrant
limited judicial review of arbitral awards containing errors in legal reason-
ing.
A. Kleine v. Catara-The Implications of Restricted and Unrestricted
Submissions
The time is long overdue for courts, arbitration practitioners, and arbitral
institutions to realize and acknowledge that in our collective zeal to extol the
benefits of arbitration, the controlling principle of arbitration law-the par-
ties' autonomous right to contractually determine the nature of the process to
be utilized in the private settlement of disputes-has been all but over-
whelmed by dogmatic and ideological theory relating to ancillary policy ob-
jectives such as finality and expediency in arbitration. From its earliest be-
ginnings, the foundation of American arbitration law always has been the
fundamental principle that it is the parties' "submission" that determines the
scope of the arbitrators' authority and, in consequence, the power of courts
to vacate arbitral awards. 76 The powers of arbitrators and courts therefore
always have been inextricably interrelated because the only means by which
private parties can be protected against acts in excess of arbitral authority is
through intervention by the courts.
77
Arbitral submissions logically and traditionally come in two generic
forms: restricted submissions that limit the arbitrators' authority in some re-
spect and unrestricted or general submissions that grant the arbitrators carte
blanche authority to resolve the parties' dispute without necessarily resorting
78to a strict application of the law. By the time the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Wilko, American courts had been considering the differing legal
ramifications of restricted and unrestricted submissions on arbitrator and ju-
dicial authority for one and a half centuries.
79
Arbitration submissions naturally can take as many forms as the imagi-
nation permits. But there is only one true form of general or unrestricted
submission because an unrestricted submission literally imposes no con-
" See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
'6 See infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
" See id.
78 See infra notes 82-144 and accompanying text.
79 See infra note 247.
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straints on the decision-making authority of an arbitrator other than specific
limitations relating to the claims to be decided and, at least by inference, the
requirement that the arbitrator be unbiased and conduct the proceeding in a
fundamentally fair manner. Although it is possible to search far back in
time for the earliest dates on which American courts addressed the concept
of unrestricted submissions, it is convenient in the course of an analysis of
Wilko to begin with the 1814 decision of the Federal Circuit Court in Kleine
v. Catara, which was authored by Justice Story and cited by the Wilko ma-
jority in its footnote 24.83 Because Kleine has been both expressly and im-
plicitly endorsed over the years by many courts, including the United States
Supreme Court, the explanation by the court in Kleine of the significance of
unrestricted submissions and their effect on the authority of arbitrators and
courts is, thus, worth quoting at length:
If the parties wish to reserve the law for the decision of the
court, they may stipulate to that effect in the submission;
they may restrain or enlarge its operation as they please. If
no such reservation is made in the submission, the parties
are presumed to agree, that every thing, both as to law and
fact, which is necessary to the ultimate decision, is included
in the authority of the referees.
Under a general submission, therefore, arbitrators have
rightfully a power to decide on the law and fact; and an er-
ror in either respect ought not to be the subject of complaint
by either party, for it is their own choice to be concluded by
the judgment of the arbitrators. Besides, under such a gen-
eral submission, the reasonable rule seems to be, that the
referees are not bound to award upon the mere dry princi-
ples of law applicable to the case before them. They may
decide up on principles of equity and good conscience, and
may make their award ex aequo et bono. If, therefore, un-
der an unqualified submission, the referees meaning to take
upon themselves the whole responsibility, and not to refer it
to the court, to decide differently from what the court would
8o See generally Sheldon v. Vermonty, 269 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the "de-
nial of a fundamentally fair hearing" as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur of an arbitral award under
the FAA). See also Karah Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 298-99 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 917 (2004) (holding that under
Article V of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, recognition and enforcement must be denied when a party has not been provided with a
"fundamentally fair hearing," and stating that the determination of whether a hearing was fundamen-
tally fair should be made by applying U.S. standards of due process).
81 Perhaps the most convenient sources for such cases are the decisions of later courts, in which the
origins of traditional vacatur law are examined. One example is Justice Story's opinion in Kleine v.
Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869), a case that is discussed throughout this arti-
cle.
82 Kleine, 14 F. Cas. at 732.
" See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 n.24.
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on a point of law, the award ought not to be set aside. If
however, the referees mean to decide according to law, and
mistake, and refer to the court to review their decision (as
in all cases, where they specially state the principles, on
which they have acted, they are presumed to do,) in such
cases the court will set aside the award, for it is not the
award, which th4 referees meant to make, and they acted
under a mistake.
In summary then, Kleine established the following regarding the author-
ity of arbitrators to issue awards under a restricted submission and the re-
lated power of courts to review such awards:
1. Under an unrestricted submission, arbitrators may, but are not obli-
gated to, follow the substantive law that applies to the dispute.
2. In the event the arbitrators elect to apply the law in resolving a dis-
pute under an unrestricted submission and identify the legal reasoning sup-
porting the award, courts are empowered to set aside the award when it is
based on mistakes in the application of that law.
Interestingly, the first of these two principles means that when acting
under an unrestricted submission, arbitrators may elect to knowingly "disre-
gard the law"--a proposition directly contrary to that stated in Wilko. Of
equal import is the fact that the basis for the second rule enunciated in
Kleine is that courts are empowered to vacate such awards due to the occur-
rence of legal errors because "it is not the award, which the referees meant to
make, and they acted under mistake." 85 The gist of Kleine is simple, and is
made even plainer by the fact that the court made a point of emphasizing
that it is the issuance of a reasoned award that compels the court to ensure
that the award is not infected by erroneous legal reasoning: If the arbitrators,
acting under an unrestricted submission, elect to apply the law in resolving
the parties' dispute and issue a reasoned award that reflects the legal reason-
ing on which the award was based, then the award is properly subject to ju-
dicial review and vacatur.
86
Before considering more recent authorities, it is worthwhile to reflect
upon the reasons why Kleine is wholly consistent with principles relating to
party autonomy. The enforcement of the highly generalized decision-
making process afforded by an unrestricted submission grants the parties the
widest possible latitude in agreeing that the award may be based on consid-
84 Kleine, 14 F. Cas. at 735 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
85 Kleine, 14 F. Cas. at 735.
86 Id. ("But here, the referees have expressly laid the grounds of their decision before us, and have
thereby submitted it for our consideration.").
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erations of fairness or equity that transcend strict legal principles. Should
the parties desire to insulate the award from judicial review, they can, in the
words of the Kleine court, "restrain" the submission by providing that the
arbitrators are to issue "a general award, without any specification of the
reasons of their decision." But once the arbitrators elect to apply the law
and issue a reasoned award, or the parties require that a reasoned award be
issued, judicial review may be necessary to ensure that the award is the
award the arbitrators "meant to make" and not an aberration, bred of inad-
vertent mistake. 8 Judicial review is available under such a circumstance,
however, not merely to effectuate the "intent" of the arbitrators, but also to
effectuate and enforce the intent of the parties. 89 That Kleine and its prog-
eny ultimately were based on a policy of enforcing party autonomy is clear
because the initial focus of the inquiry is whether the submission is restricted
or unrestricted. 9° Kleine and many of the other cases discussed in this arti-
cle thus hold that when the submission is restricted in a manner that compels
the arbitrators to apply a particular law in resolving the dispute, the parties
are contractually entitled to have the law so applied and the arbitrators are
therefore obligated to apply the law in that manner. 91 In the absence of a
finding that an arbitrator has violated a restricted submission by intentionally
ignoring applicable law, a reviewing court can only conclude that the arbi-
trator was attempting to faithfully apply the law. When the arbitrator plainly
fails in that good faith attempt to apply clearly established law, the review-
ing court thus can intervene not only in order to fulfill the realization of the
arbitrator's intent but also to enforce the parties' contractual expectations.
In essence, Kleine and the many cases that preceded and followed it repre-
sent the ultimate manifestation of a policy endorsing party autonomy in arbi-
tration.
Although this logic seems plain enough in a contractual context in
which two parties agree to the terms of a commercial transaction, 92 it is to be
87 id.
88 Kleine, 14 F. Cas. at 735.
89 At least one commentator has suggested that under this line of cases, the purpose of such limited
review was only to ensure that the award was consistent with the intent of the arbitrators. See, e.g.,
Scodro, supra note 11, at 583-84.
90 See 14 F. Cas. at 732. See also infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
9' The corollary to this point is that when the arbitrators fail to fulfill their duties in this regard, they
act in excess of their authority. See infra notes 95-101, 199-21 1, 249, 278 and accompanying text.
92 The suggestion that parties to an arbitration agreement agree that any arbitral mistake is acceptable
to them, although plausible, seems odd because particularly egregious errors can totally undermine
the essence of the parties' agreement. It is for this reason that some courts continue to acknowledge
that an arbitral award that creates a "new contract" for the parties is subject to vacatur. See infra
note 275 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, and in accord with the principle of party autonomy,
parties should be permitted to waive any right to merits-based judicial review. The laws of some
nations therefore permit parties to opt into or out of such review. See Park, supra note 13, at 12.
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conceded that in some circumstances parties might agree at the outset that
they will accept an arbitrator's decision regardless of how absurdly incorrect
it might be. And, in point of fact, the Kleine court seemed almost on the
verge of altering its analytical course when it observed that the argument
that "arbitrators cannot award contrary to law, because that is beyond their
power, for the parties intend to submit to them only the legal consequences
of their transactions and agreements," in essence "begg[ed] the question."
93
In the end, however, the court in Kleine applied the rules it had discussed,
and the rationale underlying its decision would prove to be sufficiently dura-
ble to be adopted by the United States Supreme Court.
It is clear that the critical element in the Kleine approach to the review-
ability of awards issued under an unrestricted submission involves the ques-
tion of whether the award contains express reasoning that attempts to explain
how applicable law supports the arbitrators' decision. But the only true sig-
nificance of this consideration is that it reflects a measured judicial reluc-
tance to ascertain and review the underlying basis of an arbitral decision
when the award does not clearly state the arbitrators' reasoning. 94 Kleine
thus established that awards containing legal reasoning were subject to vaca-
tur due to the existence of "mistakes" in the application of law. Contrary to
current thought and dogma, that principle never changed during the 113
years leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko.
93 See Kleine, 14 F. Cas. at 732.
94 The rule that it is the existence of a sufficiently reasoned award that determines whether a court
can even attempt to review an award for legal error was sufficiently obscure that the Supreme Court,
without Justice Story partaking, confused it in its 1840 decision in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210 (1840) in which the Court first confirmed the general rule that courts cannot
vacate arbitral awards because of a mistake in the application of law, but then vaguely affirmed the
exception to that rule by stating, "The case is different where arbitrators, conscious of a mistake,
desire to rectify it; because in that position, the supposed decision is not their judgment." Id. at 223
(emphasis added). Among a substantial number of other cases, the Court cited Kleine as supporting
these observations. Id. And in an effort to highlight the fact that its decision served to resolve any
perceived conflict in the case law-such as that with which the Kleine court itself seems to have
struggled-the Court added that "this [latter] consideration reconciles any cases of a seemingly dif-
ferent character from these above cited." Id. (emphasis added). Rather than reconciling the law,
these observations-which failed (1) to distinguish between the parties' expectations under restricted
and unrestricted submissions, (2) to explain the significance of the existence of legal reasoning in an
award, and (3) which incorrectly suggested that the arbitrator must be "conscious" of the mistake-
confused the law as explained in Kleine. The Rhode Island decision apparently faded into perma-
nent obscurity, perhaps due to the fact that the Supreme Court had further opportunities to clarify the
law during the next few decades. See infra notes 102-14 and 143-74 and accompanying text.
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These same principles were confirmed and thoroughly examined in the
New Hampshire Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Johnson v. Noble,9 a
case of particular interest in connection with an analysis of Wilko because
the court in Noble not only relied on Kleine96 but also made essentially the
same observations as were made by the Wilko Court regarding manifest dis-
regard, all in the context of a discussion of unrestricted and restricted sub-
missions. In other words, Noble provides significant evidence that the Wilko
Court did not intend to create a new doctrine relating to instances in which
arbitrators manifestly disregard applicable law and, instead, merely at-
tempted to apply legal principles that were ingrained in American arbitration
law.
The complaining party in Noble sought the vacatur of an arbitral award
based on the allegation that the arbitrators "h[ad] not acted in conformity
with their authority." 97 The allegation that the arbitrators had acted in excess
of their authority was based on the more specific contention that despite the
fact that the submission required the arbitrators to decide the parties' dispute
"according to the strict rules of law," the arbitrators allegedly "disregard[ed]
the law."9s These allegations did not involve the more arcane niceties of the
modem doctrine of manifest disregard of the law; no issue was raised re-
garding whether the arbitrators in Noble understood the law and then inten-
tionally ignored it. The defendant in Noble simply asserted that the arbitra-
tors' failure to decide the case "according to the strict rules of law" meant
that the award should be vacated. In other words, the defendant argued that
it had a contractual right to have the issues decided by a correct application
of the law.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court's analysis in Noble begins in
much the same fashion as that of the Court in Wilko-by emphasizing that
public policy supports the right of private parties to resolve their disputes
through private dispute resolution processes and that the parties therefore
were free "to bind themselves" to the decisions of the arbitrators. 99 One
natural incident to the parties' autonomy in entering into arbitration submis-
sions is the right to limit those submissions, and the court in Noble thus af-
firmed the same general principles that had been described by the court in
Kleine in 1814 relating to the diverse manner in which arbitration submis-
sions may be restricted.100 These concepts are sufficiently fundamental that
9' 13 N.H. 286 (1842) (discussing early American and English cases applying arbitration vacatur
law).
96 
Id. at 290.
9' Noble, 13 N.H. at 289.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
9' Id. at 290.
1°Id.
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they do not vary from contemporary American notions of arbitration law and
theory. But the equally logical principles that the court in Noble then pro-
ceeded to explain somehow became lost and forsaken in the aftermath of
Wilko and the surge of arbitration cases that today seemingly are over-
whelming the courts. For it is here, in the 1842 Noble decision, that is found
perhaps the first discussion of the interrelationship between unrestricted
submissions, disregard of the law by arbitrators, and mistakes in the applica-
tion of the law:
And it is very well settled, that in [a general submission]
arbitrators are not restricted by the submission to decide
according to strict principles of law, but their decision will
be in conformity with the submission, although it be made
in disregard ofthe law, and contrary thereto. They are not
bound to decide upon "mere dry principles of law," but
may decide upon principles of equity and good conscience,
and may make their award "ex aequo et bono."
The broad, reasonable, and well settled doctrine seems to
be, that if, under an unqualified or unrestricted submission,
the referees, intending to assume the whole responsibility
of determining the law, and not to refer it to the court, de-
cide differently from what the court would, on a point of
law, the award will be regarded as authorized and conclu-
sive, and will not be set aside. But if the referees, intending
to decide according to law, mistake the law, and refer the
same to the court for revision, either by an express refer-
ence, or by stating specially the principles upon which they
have acted, which raises the presumption of intention so to
refer, the award will be set aside, not for want of authority
in the arbitrators to decide against law, if they deem it just
and equitable so to decide, butfor the reason that in such a
case it is apparent thqj6 the award is not such as the refe-
rees intended to make.
Noble thus affirms the same reasoning that is found in Kleine, including
the proposition that arbitrators acting under an unrestricted submission are
free to not rely on applicable law in resolving the parties' dispute. The im-
plications of this rule with respect to the proper interpretation of Wilko and
whether the Supreme Court actually misunderstood Kleine when it cited the
case in support of its manifest disregard language, raise a variety of intrigu-
ing issues that deserve, and will receive, greater attention at a later stage of
the analysis.
'0' Noble, 13 N.H. at 291 (quoting Kleine and citing other cases with approval) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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B. Burchell v. Marsh- "Gross Mistake " vs. "Error of Judgment"
In attempting to enforce a perceived policy objective of efficiency in ar-
bitration, federal courts all too often have resorted to a brief quotation of an
isolated sentence contained in the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Burchell v. Marsh102 as supporting the proposition that courts can never re-
view arbitral awards for errors in the application of law. Indeed, the origins
of the manifest disregard doctrine can, in part, be attributed to a misreading
of, and undue reliance upon, the Burchell decision by lower federal
courts. 103 Ironically, a more thorough review of Burchell reveals that that
decision (1) is consistent with the principles discussed in both Kleine and
Noble and (2) supports a far different rule of law than that suggested by fed-
eral appellate courts that have attempted to interpret and enforce Wilko.
Although the Burchell opinion does not specifically describe the parties'
arbitration submission in that case as being unrestricted, it nevertheless ap-
pears that the submission was unrestricted. °4 More importantly, the under-
lying award in Burchell apparently did not contain sufficient reasoning for
the Court to apply the legal principles that cases such as Kleine and Noble
affirmed. 105 The Court, thus, firmly stated that "it cannot be inferred that
the arbitrators went beyond the submission" and that "there is nothing on the
record to show that the arbitrators, in making this award, exceeded their au-
thority, or went beyond the limits of the submission."1
0 6
Contrary to popular belief, Burchell is not a landmark case in which the
United States Supreme Court established new legal principles relating to the
judicial review of awards for errors in legal reasoning. The Court merely
offered a generalization of existing law to emphasize that courts should not
pry into the subjective analysis of the arbitrators, particularly when that
analysis cannot be clearly discerned due to the lack of a fully reasoned
award. More to the point, the abbreviated quotation from Burchell that is all
too frequently offered by courts and commentators ignores the more com-
plete statement in Burchell where the Court emphasized the distinction that
must be made between gross mistakes that are apparent and mere errors in
arbitral judgment. Because this distinction is of the highest relevance in at-
'02 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
'03 See infra Part IV.B.
04 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 350. Pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement, the parties agreed to
"submit 'all demands, suits, claims, causes of action, controversies, and disputes between them, to
the arbitration and award ofF. B. Mosley,' &c., 'who are to hear all matters of claim of either party,
upon or against the other, in law or equity."' Id.
'05 Id. at 351 (observing that "the record shows no admission of proof that the arbitrators allowed any
damages for the slander of Cross" and that whether the arbitrators' "decision [on questions of law
and fact] was erroneous, does not appear").
106 Id. (emphasis added).
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tempting to understand why and how the Wilko Court cited both Burchell
and Kleine as supporting its manifest disregard language, the pertinent dis-
cussion from Burchell is quoted in full:
If the award is within the submission, and contains the hon-
est decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of
the parties, a court in equity will not set it aside for error,
either in law or fact. A contrary course would be a substi-
tution of the judgment of the chancellor in the place of the
judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the
commencement, not the end, of litigation. In order, says
Lord Thurlow, (Knox v. Symonds, I Ves. Jr. 369,) "to in-
duce the court to interfere, there must be something more
than an error ofjudgment, such as corruption in the arbitra-
tor, or gross mistake, either apparent on the face of the
award, or to be made out by evidence; but in the case of
mistake, it must be made out to the satisfaction of the arbi-
trator, and that if it had not happened, he should have made
a different award."
Courts should be careful to avoid wrong use of the word
"mistake," and, by making it synonymous with mere error
ofjudgnlt, assume to themselves an arbitrary power over
awards.
Unfortunately, this careful admonition by the Supreme Court in
Burchell has been all but ignored. 1
08
Still, at least in one respect, the subsequent and frequent misreliance by
other courts on the first two sentences of the above-quoted passage from
Burchell is understandable. The Burchell Court's statement, when viewed
out of context, does arguably seem to say that courts are never permitted to
review arbitral awards for legal error. The perpetual inability of courts to
discern the true meaning of Burchell arises from those courts' failure (1) to
consider the meaning of the phrase "honest decision of the arbitrators" and
(2) to consider the legal distinction between "gross mistakes" that are "ap-
parent" on the face of the award and an "error ofjudgment." A careful read-
ing of Burchell, as well as other cases, 109 suggests that the phrase "honest
"07 Burchell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 349-50 (emphasis added).
108 Indeed, with the exception of the general acknowledgement of this statement by the court in
Mancusco v. L. Gillarde Co., 61 A.2d 677, 678-79 (D.C. 1948), no other court has bothered to cite
Burchell for this proposition.
109 See, e.g., Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286, 291 (1842) (observing that an award may be set aside
when "it is apparent that the award is not such as the referees intended to make"); Kleine v. Catara,
14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869) (stating that awards will be set aside when the award
is "not the award[] which the referees meant to make"). The difference between the "honest deci-
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decision" does not necessarily refer simply and only to the question of
whether a decision is corrupted by dishonesty but, rather, can also relate to
the subtler question regarding whether a decision is the decision that the ar-
bitrator actually meant to make.'1 0 In any event, the oft-quoted phrase in
Burchell relating to "the honest decision of the arbitrators," does not signifi-
cantly differ from the Court's observation in the latter part of the same para-
graph that distinguished between an error in judgment-in which the arbitra-
tor's subjective determination might be questionable but nonetheless reflects
the arbitrator's intended decision-and gross mistakes, which not only must
be apparent/manifest but also must be shown to relate to an objective matter
that, if properly understood by the arbitrator, would have been correctly ap-
plied by the arbitrator.
That these distinctions are real and relevant to an analysis of both Wilko
and Burchell is shown by a comparison of what the Supreme Court said in
those two decisions, spanned, as they were, by one hundred years of arbitra-
tion jurisprudence. In Wilko, the Court stated that courts are empowered to
review awards when the arbitrators "manifest[ly] disregard" the law, but not
when arbitrators err in the "interpretation of the law."'111 In Burchell, the
Court declined to vacate the award because the award involved a subjec-
tive-i.e., interpretive-issue that required the arbitrators to "estimate"
damages and render "their estimation of a matter that depends on discretion
rather than calculation."112 The Burchell Court thus reasoned that the arbi-
trators might have committed "an error in judgment, but it is no cause for
setting aside the award."
'
"
13
It therefore seems clear both from the issues involved in Burchell and
from subsequent Supreme Court decisions that the generalized observation
made in dicta by the Burchell Court relating to errors of law in arbitral deci-
sion making cannot be viewed as a critical juncture in the history of Ameri-
can arbitration law. Rather, Burchell constituted a clear affirmation of pre-
vious law that provided that an award infected by manifest errors relating to
objective matters was subject to vacatur. In any event, and as the Wilko
Court knew, the aftermath of the Civil War produced a much more signifi-
sion" of the arbitrators and the inability of arbitrators to "fairly" exercise" their judgment due to a
mistaken belief as to the application of law seems amorphous at best
"0 This observation might, on its face, seem oddly circular, yet the stated principle is ingrained in the
FAA. Section II of the FAA, which grants courts authority to correct certain mistakes in awards-
such as might arise in the course of a mathematical calculation or the description of a person-
specifically provides that the court "may modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent
thereof and promotejustice between the parties." 9 U.S.C. § II (emphasis added).
... Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427.
12 Burchell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 351.
I d. at 351-52.
26
26
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol7/iss1/1
[Vol. 7: 1, 2007]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL
cant Supreme Court decision relating to judicial review of arbitral awards for
errors in legal reasoning. 114
C. State Court Decisions in the Immediate Wake of Burchell
If Burchell actually stood for the strict rule that has been attributed to it
by federal courts subsequent to the Wilko opinion, one would expect that ju-
rists contemporary to the Burchell Court would have, at a minimum, consid-
ered whether Burchell gave reason for those courts to reconsider previously
established law. Such was not the case.
As previously discussed, in its 1842 decision in Noble, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court had affirmed the authority of New Hampshire courts to
review arbitral awards infected by errors in the application of law.11 5 The
court's application of that rule was in no way altered by the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Burchell. Instead, in two thoroughly reasoned
decisions, the New Hampshire Supreme Court generally reaffirmed its prior
holding in Noble and, in so doing, utilized phraseology with sif6ificant simi-
larities to that employed many years later by the Wilko Court.
The 1859 decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in White
Mountains Railroad v. Beane marks one of the first instances in which a
court carefully juxtaposed the applicable arbitration law pertaining to re-
stricted and unrestricted submissions and contemporaneously explained the
distinction between a "mistake of law" and an error in the "exercise of
judgment." 117 Although these distinctions are relevant to an understanding
of Wilko, White Mountains is perhaps most significant for illustrating that
there is no justification for the limiting definition that federal courts have
placed on the Wilko Court's use of the word "disregard." Federal courts
have themselves neglected to use a more complete definition of the word
"disregard" and, instead, have selectively and narrowly interpreted disregard
to mean "intentionally ignore., 118 However, White Mountains shows that
"disregard," in the context of arbitration vacatur law, can occur when arbi-
trators mistake the law-i.e., unintentionally misapply the law.
"' See infra Part Il.D.
15 See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
116 White Mountains R.R. v. Beane, 39 N.H. 107 (1859); Sanborn v. Murphy, 50 N.H. 65 (1870).
... See generally White Mountains, 39 N.H. 107.
"' See infra notes 257-61.
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Under White Mountains, when the submission is limited, "any disregard
of the limitations ... will be fatal to the award."1 19 In connection with this
statement, the only illustration the court offered as an example of such disre-
gard is the instance in which "the parties agree that the arbitrators shall make
their award agreeably to legal principles, and if they mistake the law the
award will be set aside."' 20 In a manner consistent with Kleine, Noble, and
Burchell, the White Mountains court also acknowledged that a slightly dif-
ferent rule applied to unrestricted submissions. The distinction arises be-
cause unrestricted submissions accord to the arbitrators wider latitude in
rendering their decision; in the phraseology of White Mountains, arbitrators
acting under an unrestricted submission are merely obligated to "fairly exer-
cise[] their judgment upon the question submitted to them."
121
Thus, White Mountains affirmed that when arbitrators are acting under
an unrestricted submission, the award may be vacated when the arbitrators
"have fallen into any error of facts or law which has prevented the free and
fair exercise of their judgment."' 122 This observation is entirely consistent
with the similar observation made by the Supreme Court in Burchell. 123 As
the White Mountains court further noted, when the pertinent law is unsettled
or uncertain and the arbitrator is thus required to interpret the law, courts are
not empowered to declare that the arbitrator's exercise of subjective judg-
ment in interpreting the law is erroneous.124
By 1870, the New Hampshire Supreme Court's contribution toward an
understanding of arbitration law had already been substantial. Its 1870 opin-
ion in Sanborn v. Murphy 125-a decision that was to be frequently cited by
"9 White Mountains, 39 N.H. at 108 (emphasis added).
120 Id.
121 id.
122 Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
121 See Burchell, 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 349-50 (stating that an award will not be vacated if it contains
"the honest decision of the arbitrators").
124 White Mountains, 39 N.H. at 109. Although the court in White Mountains did not utilize the word
"interpretation," it is abundantly clear that the court was discussing interpretations of subjective legal
issues:
[T]he sole ground of exception to their award is, that upon a material point of law, upon which
the rights of the parties depended, upon which the parties were fully heard by their counsel,
upon which there was room for discussion, and for much diversity of opinion, the arbitrators,
after exercising their best judgment, have arrived at a conclusion which we are asked to con-
sider and to pronounce to be erroneous. Such an exception cannot be sustained. The parties
have selected their own judges, they have deliberately submitted the matter to their decision,
and by that decision they are bound.
Id. (emphasis added).
125 Sanborn v. Murphy, 50 N.H. 65 (1870) (hereinafter Sanborn).
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other courts 126-further clarified the law and due to the depth of its analysis
and the use of certain terminology, also assists in achieving a proper under-
standing of Wilko. The court's opinion in Sanborn commences by confirm-
ing the general law discussed in Noble and White Mountains regarding the
reviewability of awards issued under unrestricted submissions'2' and then
proceeds to reaffirm many of the principles already discussed by earlier
courts, including the Supreme Court in Burchell. The court in Sanborn thus
did not suggest there was a meaningful distinction between disregarding the
law and mistaking the law when it observed that in restricted submissions,
when the arbitrators "disregard or mistake the law, the award will be set
aside."'
28
Equally significant was the court's reminder that despite the broader
discretion granted to arbitrators under unrestricted submissions, awards is-
sued under such submissions may be vacated when they are not "deliberately
and fairly made."' 129 An examination of what the court meant in its used of
the phrase "deliberately and fairly made" proves to be instructive on two
fronts. First, the Sanborn opinion confirms prior case law by emphasizing
that when arbitrators "manifestly fall[] into ... error with regard to ... law,"
such an error can "prevent[] the free and fair exercise of their judgment."
Second, after favorably quoting the observations previously made in White
Mountains regarding the unassailable nature of subjective arbitral decisions
concerning issues "upon which there was room for discussion and for much
diversity of opinion,"' 131 the court in Sanborn offered the following state-
ment, which almost seems to be designed to presciently render aid in com-
prehending the Wilko decision: "The exception has reference, it will be un-
derstood, not to an erroneous conclusion or judgment upon the application of
126 See, e.g., Crumlish v. Wilmington & W.R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 270, 273 (1879); Sanborn v. Paul, 60
Me. 325, 328 (1872) (observing that under Sanborn, parties can contractually specify that the arbi-
trators "shall be governed by the strict common rules of common law"). Even as of the date of the
issuance of the Wilko opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court continued to rely on Sanborn as
support for the principle that an award can be vacated for manifest error: "This being a general sub-
mission the award will not be disturbed for mistake except where the arbitrators 'have manifestly
fallen into such an error with regard to facts or law in the case before them as must have prevented
the full and fair exercise of their judgment upon the subject submitted to them."' See Franklin Nee-
dle Co. v. Am. Fed'n.. of Hosiery Workers, 105 A.2d 382, 385 (1954) (quoting Sanborn, 50 N.H. at
69).
127 Sanborn, 50 N.H. at 68.
2
' Id. at 67.
1
29 id.
30 Id. at 69.
131 id.
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law, but to a manifest mistake, such as must have precluded the exercise of
judgment." 132 The Sanborn court's use of the phrase "palpable error or mis-
take.., of law" 133 can easily be easily reconciled with the phrase "manifest
disregard" contained in Wilko. 134 In qualifying the stated exception as not
applying to "an erroneous conclusion or judgment upon the application of
the law,"' 135 the Sanborn opinion does not materially differ from the limita-
tion described in Wilko regarding "interpretations" of the law. Thus, the
concluding, emphatic principle in Sanborn that the manifest mistake "must
have precluded the exercise of judgment" in no way differs from the
Burchell Court's requirement that the award contain the honest decision of
the arbitrators. 1
36
The 1874 opinion of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in Wil-
loughby v. Thomas 137 also generally confirmed the "well-settled rule[s]" that
(1) arbitrators "may disregard the law entirely and decide upon principles of
equity and good conscience exclusively" and (2) "[i]f [the arbitrators] mean
to conform to the law, and they plainly mistake it, such mistake is sufficient
to invalidate it."' 138 As a synonym for a "plain mistake of law," the court in
Willoughby also used various phrases, including "plain and palpable mistake
of law"1 39 and "manifest mistake of law,"'140 the latter of which approxi-
mates the very language used by the Wilko Court. As if to contrast subjec-
tive interpretations of unsettled law with the understanding of objective,
clearly established law, and in a manner consistent with several cases-
including Burchell-that already have been discussed above, the court con-
cluded that it could not say that the award "was made under misapprehen-
sion of the law."'
14 1
132 id.
133 Id.
'3 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) ("In unrestricted submissions... the interpretations
of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation.").
135 Sanborn, 50 N.H. at 69.
136 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 352 (1854).
137 Willoughby v. Thomas, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) 521 (1874).
138 Id. at 531 (quoting Moore v. Luckess, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 160 (1873)). In Moore, the court also
used the phrase "plain and palpable" in characterizing the showing that must be made in order for a
court to vacate an award based on errors of law, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) at 165, and, in that discussion,
observed that "[t]here is no controversy in regard to these principles." The "real difficulty" ad-
dressed by the court in Moore concerned the ancillary question of whether "such mistake [may] be
established by extrinsic evidence." Id. at 164. The court's resolution of that issue reflects a prag-
matic and reasonably modem approach that denies the use of testimony for such a purpose but does
allow the use of formal "pleadings and exhibits filed in the pending case." Id. at 165.
"9 Willoughby, 65 Va. (24 Gratt.) at 530-31.
140 Id. at 531.
141 Moore, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) at 163.
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At least one other state court was to apply these long-standing arbitra-
tion principles in the first two decades following Burchell.142 Before that
decision was affirmed, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in
United States v. Farragut, 143 a case that provides great insights into the
Court's decision in Wilko and which, indeed, was cited by the Court in
Wilko 144 but which, for unknown reasons, has been neglected by courts and
commentators who have attempted to analyze the illusive meaning of mani-
fest disregard of the law.
D. United States v. Farragut- "Note the Right of Review"
The only thing unclear about the United States Supreme Court's 1874
decision in Farragut is why the opinion has never received the attention it
deserves from scholars and the courts. To a certainty, the Supreme Court's
lengthy discussion, and resulting application, of vacatur law in Farragut was
clear and decisive. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Wilko Court not
only cited Farragut in its footnote 24 as supporting its observations regard-
ing "manifest disregard" and errors in "interpretation of law" but also took
care, through the means of a parenthetical statement accompanying its cita-
tion to Farragut, to caution future readers to "note the right of review" that
was affirmed in Farragut.145 It confounds reason that under these circum-
stances, not a single case has ever seriously analyzed the Court's decision in
Farragut in an effort to understand Wilko. Yet that appears to be just what
has occurred or, better stated, what has never occurred.
The facts that gave rise to Farragut are of such historical significance in
relation to the American Civil War, 1-46 and the personalities of the litigants,
their counsel, and the arbitrators so dynamic and remarkable, 147 that it is
142 See Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392 (App. Div. 1875).
143 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 406 (1874).
141 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437 n.24 (1953).
145 Id.
146 In a lengthy essay describing "the opening of the Mississippi" in the early years of the Civil War,
one of the parties to Farragut-Admiral David Porter-asserted that "the most important event of
the War of the Rebellion, with the exception of the fall of Richmond, was the capture of New Or-
leans and the forts Jackson and St. Philip, guarding the approach to that city." See David D. Porter,
Admiral, U.S.N., The Opening of the Lower Mississippi, in BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL
WAR, NORTH TO ANTIETAM 22 (1956).
147 Admiral Farragut, who was deceased by the time the Farragut decision was issued, had gained
fame immemorial as a result of not only the capture of New Orleans but also the even more publi-
cized victory at the battle of Mobile Bay at which he reportedly commanded his men to lash him to
the ship's rigging in order to preserve his view of the combat and at which he supposedly gave the
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tempting to linger over such matters at length. In the interest of brevity,
however, it is sufficient here to provide only the most general of summaries
relating to the nature of the case.
The underlying facts in Farragut concerned the "capture of a large
number of vessels, coal, and other property" in the course of the naval and
land battle for New Orleans and Forts Jackson and St. Philip during early
1862.148 At the time of those famous events, David Farragut was the Flag-
Officer of the Western Gulf Squadron of the United States Navy, which was
charged with blockading Confederate maritime traffic in the Gulf of Mex-
ico. 149 During a period of approximately six weeks, and in cooperation with
Major-General Butler, who controlled a land force of 18,000 men, Flag-
Officer Farragut "reduced" the Confederate-controlled forts in the immedi-
ate vicinity of New Orleans, after which, and with the aid of a general mu-
tiny by the Confederate garrison at Fort Jackson, Major-General Butler's
command, "Damn the Torpedoes-full speed ahead!" See BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL
WAR, THE WAY TO APPOMATTOX, 379-419 (1956); BRUCE CATTON, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
PICTURE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 517 (1960). But Farragut was not the only "personality" in-
volved in the appeal to the Supreme Court. The named libellants also included Admiral David Por-
ter, who played his own pivotal role in the United States Navy's conquest of the Confederate forts,
including Vicksburg, which lined the lower Mississippi River. The arbitration panel, itself, also in-
cluded luminaries such as Gustavus Vasa Fox, a Civil War-era assistant secretary of the Navy, and
Henry W. Paine, a prominent New England lawyer and one-time candidate for the governorship of
Massachusetts. See generally CORRESPONDENCE OF GUSTAVUS VASA Fox 1861-1865 (R. M.
Thompson & R. Wainwright eds. 1918); WILLIAM MATHEWS, HENRY W. PAINE, A GREAT NEW
ENGLAND LAWYER (1894). Counsel for the disputing parties also enjoyed their own measure of
fame. In addition to being represented by G. H. Williams, the attorney general of the United States,
the government retained the services of R. M. Corwine, an Ohio attorney who, among other accom-
plishments, gained notoriety as one of four Republican delegates to alter their votes at the infamous
Chicago Convention of 1860, thereby giving Abraham Lincoln the necessary majority to obtain the
party nomination for the presidency of the United States. SEE H. HOWE, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS
OF OHIO, VOL. 1 939 (1888). Not to be outdone, Admiral Farragut's interests were represented by
none other than the same former Major General Benjamin F. Butler who commanded the land forces
during the capture of New Orleans and whose stormy relationship with first general and then Presi-
dent Ulysses S. Grant was paralleled by a populist political career that included serving as governor
of Massachusetts and accepting the nomination of the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties for the
presidency in 1888. See generally Francis Russell, Butler the Beast? AMERICAN HERITAGE
MAGAZINE, Apr. 1968. Similarly, Admiral Porter was represented by Hubley Ashton, a former as-
sistant attorney general and confidant of William Douglas O'Conner. See generally DESHAE E.
LOTT, WALT WHITMAN: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (1998), available at
http://www.whitmanarchive.org/disciples/oconnerbiograph.html. For an abbreviated chronology
identifying the Civil War naval campaigns of Farragut, Porter, and others, see the Department of the
Navy's Naval Historical Center website at http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/civilwar.htm (last vis-
ited April 11, 2006).
141 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 410.
141 See BRUCE CANTON, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE PICTURE HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 170-72
(1960) (describing the blockade of the Confederate coast line and depicting the disposition of the
various United States navy squadrons); Porter, supra note 146, at 29 ("As soon as possible Farragut
proceeded to his station and took command of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron.").
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troops occupied the forts and then took possession of the city. "0 In the af-
termath of the battle, the United States naval and land forces seized a sub-
stantial number of vessels and other property. The captured property was
promptly appraised for the purposes of the "prize laws" but was never relin-
quished to a local federal court for a variety of reasons, including the ab-
sence of a local functioning federal district court and the predictable fact that
much of the property had been confiscated by the United States Army and
Navy, which had more immediate uses for the property in mind. 51 The
pressing events of the moment distracted the interested parties and therefore
it was not until 1869 that Congress enacted legislation designed to grant to
then-Admiral Farragut and the officers and crews of the Western Gulf
Squadron "the benefits of the prize laws in the same manner as they would
have been" had circumstances allowed immediately following the battle for
New Orleans.' 52 On behalf of himself and his fellow officers and crews,
Admiral Farragut then promptly filed his libel in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia seeking compensation for a variety of property primar-
ily composed of an extraordinary collection of sailing vessels and steam-
ships, some of which had been sunk and others which were still under con-
struction at the time of the critical events. 153
In pursuance of its duties to the American public, the United States
Treasury Department "informed the District Attorney of the United States at
Washington" that the captures were not prize of war and thus proposed that
the claim in libel be resisted. 15 By agreement, the parties submitted the en-
tire controversy to three arbitrators and agreed in the text of the arbitration
submission that the resulting award would be entered as a decree in the Su-
preme Court of the District Columbia and that either party would be entitled
"to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States as from other decrees
or judgments in prize cases."'1 55 The resulting arbitral award was clearly fa-
vorable to the libellants, and the United States appealed. 156
M5o Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 408.
151 Id. Relinquishment to a local federal court was required by law in order for the property to be
"condemned as prize at the time of capture." Id.
I5 2 1d. at 410-11.
153 Id. at 411-12.
114 Id. at 412.
'
55 Id. at 413.
156 Id. at 415.
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With so much at stake, both in terms of fame and fortune, 157 it is likely
that the disputing parties were surprised to find, upon their first reading of
the Supreme Court's opinion in Farragut, that the Court's analysis spent lit-
tle time discussing the logistics of the famous battle or the niceties and pecu-
liarities of the law of capture and instead, provided a thorough discussion of
arbitration vacatur law. F58 To the chagrin at least of the United States gov-
ernment, the pivotal issue in the appeal proved to be precisely the same issue
as is addressed in this article and by the Supreme Court in Wilko-i.e., the
scope of a reviewing court's authority to vacate an arbitral award based on
the occurrence of error in the application of substantive law. 
159
The Court's analysis in Farragut begins by deftly dispensing with pre-
liminary arguments that would sound familiar to contemporary litigators
who seek the most favorable judicial construction of their client's arbitration
provision. 160 Accordingly, the Court rejected both the government's argu-
ment that the special provision granting a right of appeal to the Supreme
Court "opens the entire case ... as though no award had been made" I and
the libellants' contention that the provision that declared that the award
would be "final upon all questions of law and fact ... forbids any inquiry
into any question of law or fact passed on by the arbitrators."' 162 The Court,
in essence, found these provisions to simply be designed to ensure that the
arbitrators' award was treated as any other award on appeal. 1
63
Before discussing controlling arbitration vacatur law, the Farragut
Court first noted that although the parties had agreed to submit their dispute
to an arbitration process that would culminate in the issuance of an award
that was "final upon all questions of law and fact," that agreement did not
mean that the resulting arbitral award necessarily represented the last word
as to the correct application of the law in the parties' dispute. 164 The Court
then proceeded to concisely describe the proper operation of vacatur law in
157 At least one source claims that the portion of the damages sustained by the Supreme Court in
Farragut constituted the highest damages award affirmed by the Court at that time. See Russell,
supra note 147.
"' 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 419-24.
59 Id. at 419 ("The first and most important question arising in the argument of the case before us,
respects the validity of the award and its effect in limiting the field of investigation of this court on
appeal.") (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 419-20.
161 Id. at 419.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 419 ("This award is to be construed here and its effect determined by the same general prin-
ciples which would govern it in a court of common law or of equity.").
164 Id. at 420. "Nor do we conceive, notwithstanding the expression in the agreement of submission,
that all questions of law in the case are concluded by the award. In this respect, it is no more than a
submission of all matters involved in the suit." Id.
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terminology consistent with earlier cases and with the phraseology that
would be employed eighty years later by the Supreme Court in Wilko:
The award was also liable, like any other award, to be set
aside in the court below, for such reasons as are sufficient
in other courts. For exceeding the power conferred by the
submission, for manifest mistake of law, for fraud, and for
all the reasons oM5which awards are set aside in courts of
law or chancery.
It would give the Farragut Court undue credit to suggest that it was in
Farragut that the concept of manifest mistake of the law-i.e., manifest dis-
regard of the law-was born. Other decisions, such as those in Kleine,
166
Burchell, 167 and Noble, 168 plainly illustrate that the same concepts, described
through the use of varying terminology, were applied at earlier times. The
Wilko Court's endorsement, in a single footnote, of Kleine, Burchell, and
Farragut surely was meant to show that the concept of manifest mistake of
the law was recognized in all three of those decisions.
The Farragut Court's statement that "unless it can be shown that in
making this award [the arbitrators] have acted upon a manifest mistake of
law, the award must be upheld,"' 169 cannot logically be said to differ from
the Wilko Court's observation, for which it cited Farragut as authority, that
"the interpretations of the law by arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review.' 70  Similarly, in
light of the Farragut Court's observation that "[t]here [was] no evidence
here of an misapprehension of the law ... and the award, is therefore, con-
clusive,"' 1 it must be presumed that the Wilko Court perceived the distinc-
tion between an "apprehension" of the law and an "interpretation" of the law
when the Court offered the contrasting observation that "error in interpreta-, 172
tion" is not subject to judicial review. It was no doubt for this very rea-
son-that subjective, interpretive arbitral decisions cannot be subjected to a
subsequent judicial interpretation of the same issue-that the Court in Far-
ragut emphasized that although "concrete propositions of law" made by ar-
165 Id. (emphasis added).
6 Kleine v. Catara, 14 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7869).
167 Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
168 Johnson v. Noble, 13 N.H. 286 (1842).
169 Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 421 (emphasis added).
"0 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
'71 Farragut, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 420 (emphasis added).
72 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
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bitrators are reviewable, "[w]here a proposition is one of mixed fact and law,
in which the error of law, if there is one, cannot be distinctly shown, the par-
ties must abide by the award." 1
73
The heart of the Farragut opinion concerns the proper application of ar-
bitration vacatur law. The Court summarily affirmed the primary factual de-
terminations of the arbitrators concerning the identification of the vessels
and property at issue and the legal conclusion that such property "was liable
to capture, and condemnation, and lawful prize of war," but ordered the va-
catur of one modest aspect of the arbitrators' damages determination be-
cause it was "apparent" and "seen on the face of the award" that the arbitra-
tors "violate[d] law and justice" when, without legal justification, they
granted incremental damages for salvage of certain vessels. 174  There is
nothing in Farragut to suggest that the arbitrators deliberately ignored the
law in this respect; the opinion only indicates that they manifestly mistook
the law or misapprehended it.
E. Prelude to the FAA
At least as it is applied by state courts and lower federal courts, contem-
porary American arbitration vacatur law has little resemblance to the law as
explained and applied in cases such as Kleine, Noble, Burchell, and Farra-
gut. And yet there are no clear policy-based reasons why the law of the past
should differ so greatly from the law of the present. Following the issuance
of the Farragut opinion, and for at least another decade, appellate courts in a
variety of jurisdictions, including New York, 75 Delaware, 7 6 and Mary-
land, 17 continued to recognize the law as established in those earlier deci-
sions. By 1888, however, state courts began, for no apparent reason, to ap-
... 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 420 (emphasis added). The reason being that arbitral interpretations of un-
settled law cannot be subjected to judicial review.
174 Id. at 424.
175 See Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 400 (App. Div. 1875) (applying Kleine
and affirming that in unrestricted submissions (1) an award may be "set aside for error of law, when
the question of law is stated on the face of the award, and it appears that the arbitrators meant to de-
cide according to the law but did not," and (2) arbitrators may "disregard strict rules of law or evi-
dence and decide according to their sense of equity").
176 See Crumlish v. Wilmington & Western R.R. Co., 5 Del. Ch. 270 (1879) (citing Sanborn and stat-
ing that the "exception" to the general rule that arbitral awards are not reviewable for legal error "is
the case where the arbitrators have manifestly fallen into such error with regard to the facts or law..
. as must have prevented the free and fair exercise of their judgment").
177 See Woods v. Matchett, 47 Md. 390, 392 (1877) (citing various cases, including Farragut, as
supporting the general principle that, "if an arbitrator discloses in his award the grounds of his deci-
sion, the presumption is that he intended to decide according to law, and, if such award is contrary to
law, it may be set aside").
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ply the former decisions more narrowly 178 or to occasionally neglect to ac-
knowledge the existence of certain "exceptions" that allowed the vacatur of
awards for legal error under limited circumstances. 179 Lawyers have always
been a convenient foil for explaining something good gone bad, and in this
case, there may be some validity to the maxim; there is clear evidence that
before the conclusion of the nineteenth century, trial counsel were actively
offering formal legal arguments that confused the meaning of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Burchell and Farragut. 1
80
With the passage of additional time, and with some exceptions,' 8 ' fed-
eral courts seemed to be more and more content to fall into a pattern in
which they limited the application of the rule established in Burchell and
other cases that permitted the vacatur of awards based on manifest legal er-
rors so as to apply it only in instances in which the arbitrator was guilty of
some form of bad faith conduct.' 82 It seems likely that these developments
178 See, e.g., Brush v. Fisher, 70 Mich. 469, 476 (1888) (citing, inter alia, Burchell for supposedly
supporting a rule that provides that an error in the application of law is not grounds for setting aside
an award "unless the error was so gross as of itself to furnish clear proof of corruption and fraud").
179 See, e.g., Masury v. Whiton, Ill N.Y. 679, 680 (1888) (incorrectly citing Fudickar as holding
that in the absence of "proof of any misconduct on the part of the arbitrator," an award cannot be set
aside); Hoffman v. DeGraff, 109 N.Y. 638, 640 (1888) (incorrectly citing Fudickar as supporting the
proposition that awards cannot be vacated for errors of law "in the absence of corruption or miscon-
duct").
' See, e.g., Bailey v. District of Columbia, 4 App. D.C. 356 (D.C. Cir. 1894). The description of the
arguments of counsel in the case clearly illustrates the risk at which courts are placed when they are
dependent on counsel for an explication of the law. In Bailey, counsel for the appellant vigorously
asserted that Burchell "precise[ly]" determined that arbitral awards issued under an unrestricted
submission were not subject to judicial review, whereas counsel for the appellee relied on Farragut
as establishing that "[i]f the arbitrator professes to decide upon the law and he mistakes it, the court
will set aside the award." Id. In the end, the court disposed of the case on other grounds and, there-
fore, did not address the issue. Id.
181 See, e.g., Brodhead-Garret Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 124 S.E. 600, 601-02 (W.Va. 1924). The
court's decision in Brodhead-Garret, which relies, in part, on Noble, provides yet another detailed
explanation of traditional arbitration vacatur law, under which (1) arbitrators acting under unre-
stricted submissions "do not have to follow strict rules of law," (2) awards issued under unrestricted
submissions may be vacated due to "a clear and palpable mistake of law" when "the arbitrators in-
tended to decide the controversy according to the rules of law," and (3) if the arbitrators who "mis-
take the law on some doubtful point, it will not cause the award to be disturbed." Id.
182 See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 33 App. D.C. 350 (D.C. Cir. 1909) (citing Burchell and reason-
ing that "[t]here is no allegation of any fraud practised upon him by which his mistakes, if any, were
superinduced; [h]ence, the so-called mistakes of law and fact.., amount to errors ofjudgment com-
mitted in that determination, and nothing more"); Robertson v. Lion Ins. Co., 73 F. 928, 930
(C.C.W.D. Va. 1896) (citing Burchell and then observing that the "true test of the award is this: Is
this of so extravagant a character as to warrant the conclusion that it was found and concluded from
a partisan bias towards one of the parties?").
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at the turn of the twentieth century were inadvertent and did not mark some
form of judicial activism in the arena of arbitration law or indicate that
courts were intentionally ignoring a century and more of court decisions and
United States Supreme Court precedent. That conclusion gains only some
support from the fact that not a single decision in which Burchell and other
cases were misapplied is accompanied by either an explanation of why the
court believed it was necessary and proper to deviate from existing law or an
acknowledgment that the court was deviating from existing law. It is some-
thing of an irony that these developments occurred in tandem with the evolv-
ing trend of judicial hostility toward the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments and the resulting ouster doctrine under which courts refused to
enforce waivers of the right to access to the courts. 183 The latter attitude-
judicial hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements-was viewed
by the business community as an immediate problem of critical propor-
tions, whereas the fact of the former development--of intermediate
courts' failure properly to apply existing vacatur law-went all but unno-
ticed.
IV. THE HISTORY AND ENACTMENT OF THE FAA
A. The Legislative History of the FAA
No one can deny that the passage of the FAA in 1925 represented a wa-
tershed event in American arbitration law. 15 Indeed, the very purpose of
the FAA was to counter evolving judicial "hostility" to arbitration clauses,
which hostility was manifested by the so-called ouster doctrine. 186 But that
was its only purpose. The FAA was not intended to meaningfully alter tradi-
183 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898) (observing that contracts that "oust
the jurisdiction of the courts, and substitute for them an extra-legal tribunal of their own creation"
are unenforceable).
' See Milana Koptsiovsky, Note, A Right to Contract for Judicial Review of an Arbitration Award:
Does Freedom of Contract Apply to Arbitration Agreements? 36 CoNN. L. REV. 609, 612 & n.24
(2004) (pertaining to enhanced review clauses in arbitration agreements). The student author pro-
vides a notably thorough analysis of the legislative history of the FAA and concludes that under the
FAA, contracting parties should be permitted to contractually modify the FAA to permit enhanced
judicial review "because the standards set forth in the FAA are merely default provisions, effective
only in the absence of a contractual clause." Id. at 611.
185 The advent of the statute is viewed by some authorities as having been sufficiently momentous as
to warrant a periodic birthday celebration. See, e.g., William K. Slate 11, An Anniversary Worth
Celebrating: 80 Years of the FAA, 59 DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 1; Gene Truncellito,
Year-Long Lecture Series Celebrating FAA's 80th Birthday Begins, 59 Disp. RESOL. J., Nov. 2004-
Jan. 2005, at 4.
186 For Congress' 1924 description of the ouster doctrine, see H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924).
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tional American arbitration vacatur law and the force and significance of
cases such as Kleine, Burchell, and Farragut.
There are those commentators who assert that the FAA, and more spe-
cifically section 10 of the FAA, served to quell forever the notion that courts
were empowered to review arbitral awards for legal error. Those assertions,
however, do not rely on specific legislative history, but instead tend to be
characterized by (1) unsupported argument, 187 (2) reliance on considerations
apparently relating to efficiency, I 8 or (3) an isolated reading of section 10
of the FAA that ignores the historical context that is directly relevant in
evaluating the actual language of the statute. 189  Moreover, all of these
187 See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through a Func-
tional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 149 (2002) (stating that the "drafters [of the FAA] debated
whether awards should be subject to substantive judicial review for error of fact and law, and de-
cided limited review was integral to the goals and functions of arbitration" (emphasis added)). In
actuality, there was no "debate" on the floor of either chamber regarding the vacatur provisions of
the FAA. More importantly, the "drafters" to whom the author refers additionally stated in a publi-
cation that was contemporaneous with the passage of the FAA that the provisions of the FAA al-
lowed for vacatur of an award when the "enforcement would obviously be unjust," a standard that is
more than reminiscent of the gross mistake or manifest mistake standards the Supreme Court applied
respectively in Burchell and Farragut. See infra note 198. Finally, the Supreme Court has firmly
stated that the very authorities relied on by the author cannot be considered to be "legislative his-
tory" that can be relied upon in interpreting the FAA. See infra note 198. Nevertheless, in the inter-
est of a complete discussion of the history of the FAA, the statements by the "drafters" of the FAA
will also be discussed in this article. See also Katherine van Wezel Stone, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 979-
84 (1999) (asserting (1) that in an "attempt to appease critics of the New York arbitration act," the
primary author of that statute-Julius Henry Cohen-actually intentionally misrepresented the intent
of the statute when he stated in a 1921 Yale Law Journal article that under the New York statue
awards were subject to vacatur for "mistake"; and (2) that Cohen offered "a misleading ... descrip-
tion" of the New York act's provisions). These allegations are not only unsupported, but also seem
to suggest that Congress could not have relied on, and did not rely on, the veracity of Cohen's state-
ments when it considered the passage of the FAA. If anything, the author's observations tend to
corroborate the proposition that in enacting the FAA, Congress did, indeed, intend to permit the va-
catur of arbitral awards for traditional arbitration law grounds since the clear representation by
Cohen---one of the authors of the predecessor New York statute-was that review of awards for le-
gal error was permissible under some circumstances. In his 1921 article Cohen thus distinguished
between the determination of "questions offact," which became the sole province of the arbitrator
under the statute, and "common-law ... protection of the courts," which remained undisturbed by
the statute. See id. at 984, n.327 (emphasis added). Cohen generally repeated these statements in a
1926 article when he observed that under the FAA awards may be vacated in "cases in which en-
forcement would obviously be unjust." See infra note 198.
188 See, e.g., THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 260
(1997) (stating that the "practice" of judicial review of the merits of arbitral awards "contradicts the
gravamen of the legislation and the judicial policy that sprung from it").
189 See, e.g., Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Rela-
tionship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
443, 450 n.21, 489 (1998) (stating that the legislative history of the FAA does not provide guidance
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commentators apparently are comfortable with the idea that in passing the
FAA, Congress radically and yet unanimously altered existing vacatur law
with no debate and no express statement that such was Congress' intent. 190
Other commentators contend that the FAA does permit limited judicial
review for legal error, and yet they also fail to consider the actual legislative
and judicial history underlying and preceding the act. 191 These competing
perspectives lend more mystery to the Wilko saga, if only for the reason that
they underscore the question regarding why the conventional interpretation
of Wilko has not been more rigorously challenged by an analysis that in-
cludes a specific consideration of the legislative history of the FAA. After
all, in connection with its discussion of vacatur law and in conjunction with
its manifest disregard language and its citations to Kleine, Burchell, and
Farragut, the Wilko Court not only specifically cited section 10 of the FAA
in interpreting section 10. "Congress's intent regarding the vacatur of commercial arbitration awards
must be divined from the clear and unambiguous language of section 10(a)."); Hayford, supra note
7, at 746 ("Because of the scant instructive legislative history underlying section 10(a) and the re-
mainder of the FAA the intent of Congress regarding vacatur of commercial arbitration awards must
be divined from the clear and unambiguous words of the subject provision."). Professor Hayford's
observations in this regard do not appear to take into account the origins of the relevant statutory
language or the fact that courts had been applying those same statutory and common law standards
for many years prior to the enactment of the FAA. Furthermore, it is debatable whether the provi-
sions of section 10 are truly "clear and unambiguous." As is noted elsewhere in this article, the con-
cept of an act in excess of arbitral authority and that of the imperfect execution of arbitral powers
both have been interpreted variously by different courts. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying
text. See infra notes 199-211, 249, 278 and accompanying text. Section 10 merely reiterates these
time-honored standards and its enactment therefore did nothing to clarify when and how arbitrators
can exceed their authority or imperfectly execute their duties. In any event, it is difficult to see how
it can be said that arbitrators who have committed a gross or manifest mistake have executed their
duties with perfection. In contrast, it is far easier to demonstrate that when the submission implicitly
or explicitly requires the correct application of law, any incorrect application of law is not consistent
with the authority granted to the arbitrator. At least since the 1814 decision in Kleine, courts have
debated the question regarding whether a manifestly erroneous decision violates an arbitration sub-
mission and, thus, constitutes an arbitral act in excess of authority. Under these circumstances, it
cannot be said that in adopting the long-standing excess of authority and imperfect execution of
powers standards for vacating arbitral awards, Congress clearly and unambiguously directed that
those grounds could not be relied upon in instances of gross mistake or manifest errors in the appli-
cation of clearly established law.
'
90 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 108 (1992).
19' See, e.g., EDWARD BRUNET & CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ADVOCATE'S PERSPECTIVE 324, 411-12 (1997) (contending that the use of the term "rights" in sec-
tion 10(a)(3) suggests that "the drafters intended that courts should have some ability to set aside
awards for denial of rights," including the right to have the law correctly interpreted). See also
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute
Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1199, 1254 (2000) (quoting Brunet & Craver, supra, and observing
that the argument "certainly raises the question whether [section 10(a)(3)] should be more broadly
construed").
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but also made it clear that it saw no contradiction between section 10 and the
vacatur of awards for what it called "manifest disregard" of the law. 1
92
Although it was not the purpose of Professor Ian Macneil to linger on,
or address in depth, the topic of merits-based review of awards under the
FAA, he nonetheless has offered the most definitive and accurate statement
of congressional intent with regard to vacatur under the FAA. According to
Professor Macneil, Section 10 was not intended to alter then-existing com-
mon law relating to vacatur, but instead was merely an effort to acknowl-
edge that law through extremely generalized statutory codification:
Sections [10 and 11] constitute limitations on the basic
principle enunciated in section 2 in the form of specified
grounds for vacation and modification of arbitral awards.
They do not, however, constitute a significant departure
from common law or statutory arbitration as it existed be-
fore modern arbitration statutes. The A.B.A and Congress
might have adopted the [FAA] without such sections and
simply relied on the commfft law. Instead this somewhat
tidier solution was adopted.
The legislative history of the FAA both directly and indirectly corrobo-
rates this conclusion.
As noted above, there was only one real purpose to the FAA: it had
nothing to do with vacatur law and everything to do with remedying the re-
current problems caused by the ouster doctrine, under which courts routinely
refused to enforce agreements to arbitrate. 94 This fact is consistently evi-
denced by the testimony of witnesses who appeared before various congres-
sional committees and by statements made by congressional members prior
to the unanimous enactment of the FAA. For example, as early as 1923, in
an effort to explain the purpose of the proposed legislation, the first witness
to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee simply stated, "The funda-
mental conception underlying the law is to make arbitration agreements
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable."' 195 At the opening of the January 9,
192 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953) (observing that "it may be true... that a failure of
the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the Securities Act would 'constitute
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the [FAA]') (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201
F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)).
193 MACNEIL, supra note 190, at 104 (emphasis added).
'94 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 F. 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1898); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
195 Sales and Contracts to sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbi-
tration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th
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1924 joint hearings before the Senate and House Subcommittees of the
Committees on the Judiciary, Senator Sterling similarly noted that the pro-
posed legislation were bills "to make valid and enforceable written provi-
sions or agreements for arbitration."1 96 The 1924 House Report on the pro-
posed legislation, thus, states in clear terms that "[tihe purpose of this bill is
to make valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration" and that "[t]he bill
declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and
provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement."' 97 And, as
if to ensure that there would be no future debate regarding the true intent of
the FAA, Representative Graham emphatically observed that other than re-
solving issues relating to the ouster doctrine, the legislation did not change
existing law or create new law:
It does not involve any new principle of law except to pro-
vide a simple method by which parties may be brought be-
fore the court in order to give enforcement to that which
they have already agreed to. It does not affect any contract
that has not the agreement in it to arbitrate, and only gives
the opportunity ajter personal service of asking the parties
to come in and carry through, in good faith, what they have
agreed to do. It does nothing more than that. It creates no
new legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to
enforce an agreeint in commercial contracts and in ad-
miralty contracts.
Cong. 2 (1923) (testimony of Charles L. Bemheimer, Chairman, Arbitration Comm. of the New
York Chamber of Commerce).
196 Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Sub-
comm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 1 (1924).
'97 H.R. REP. No. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924).
198 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added). It is well known that the FAA was modeled after
New York's existing arbitration statute. See I IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW
§ 8.1. But that fact does not alter or affect the conclusions established here. Interestingly, the "true"
drafters of the FAA-virtually all of who were American Bar Association [hereinafter "ABA"]
delegates-authored publications contemporaneous with the enactment of the FAA in which their
post-enactment descriptions of the intent and purpose of the FAA did not differ from that of the
statements by other witnesses and sponsors of the FAA. See Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155
(1925) ("[T]he primary purpose of the statute is to make enforcible in Federal courts such agree-
ments for arbitration .... ); Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REv. 265, 265 (1926) (stating that the FAA was intended to "reverse the hoary doctrine
that agreements for arbitration are revocable at will and are unenforceable"). It should be acknowl-
edged that in the article by Cohen and Dayton, both of whom were involved in the lobbying effort
before Congress, the authors also provided a lengthy, if not somewhat rambling, description of the
operation of section 10. That description is so meandering, however, that it defies understanding.
For instance, the authors stated that an award is subject to vacatur for defects that are "so inherently
vicious that, as a matter of common morality, it ought not to be enforced" and that awards may be
vacated in "cases in which enforcement would obviously be unjust," and then seemed to contradict
these statements by noting that "[t]here is not opportunity for the court, in connection with the
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B. The Origins of Section 10 of the FAA
While it may be true that there is less legislative history relating to the
FAA, at least in the form of transcribed testimony and statement than might
be the norm with respect to contemporary legislation, there certainly is suffi-
cient evidence to conclude that in passing the FAA, Congress did not intend
to alter existing vacatur law. That conclusion is corroborated by the fact that
the language of the FAA specifying the grounds upon which an award could
be vacated was not newly created to enforce a novel, more rigid standard of
review and, instead, found its origins in traditional American vacatur law.
More to the point, for more than a century prior to the enactment of the
FAA, the very language that later became embodied in the FAA, and which
described the limited grounds upon which an award could be vacated, was
deemed by courts to include the circumstances in which a manifest mistake
in the application of clearly established law occurred.
In this respect, the wording of section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, allows for
the vacatur of an award "[w]here the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made," 99 is particularly important. It is
more than mere coincidence that this very phrase was in use by the courts of
New York at least as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. In
200Jackson v. Ambler, the court thus observed that "[w]here a submission has
been sanctioned by an act of the legislature, it cannot be drawn into question,
unless the arbitrators have exceeded their powers, or executed them imper-
fectly., 20 1 Even modem New York jurisprudence recognizes that some er-
rors in legal reasoning can constitute an act in excess of authority; 20 2 thus,
there seems to be little reason to argue that when Congress adopted the same
standard it did not intend for the same rule to apply. Significantly, by the
mid-nineteenth century, the dual grounds for vacating an award based on
award, to inject its own ideas of what the award should have been." Id. at 273. It is perhaps for this
very reason that the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that at least with respect to divin-
ing the legislative intent of the FAA, the statements of the ABA delegates are not to be considered.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 120 (2001) (referring to the 1923 hearing be-
fore the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and stating "we ought not attribute
to Congress an official purpose based on the motives of a particular group that lobbied for or against
a certain proposal-even assuming the precise intent of the group can be determined").
'99 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (emphasis added).
200 14 Johns. 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817).
201 Id. at I11.
202 See infra note 275 and accompanying text.
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acts exceeding authority or constituting an imperfect execution of powers
were imbedded not only in New York statutory law, 203 but also the statutory
law of other states. 204
At the commencement of the twentieth century, the New York Court of
Appeals, the highest court of the state of New York, found occasion to apply
section 2374 of the New York Revised Statutes, which clearly also was a
precursor to section 10 of the FAA.2 °5 The decision of the New York Court
of Appeals in Wilkins v. Allen 20 6 is particularly important to an analysis of
both the intent of the FAA, and the intended meaning of the manifest disre-
gard language in Wilko. The Wilkins court discussed the limited statutory
grounds on which an arbitral award could be set aside, including awards
found to be based on a "perverse misconstruction... on the part of the arbi-
ter." 20 7 This principle, which may well have included perverse misconstruc-
tion of either law or fact, was no aberration of New York arbitration law. 208
For many years after the issuance of the Wilkins opinion and, indeed, after
the passage of the FAA, New York courts continued to acknowledge that de-
spite New York's limited statutory grounds for vacating an award, "perverse
misconstruction" was not among the "risks" parties assumed when they en-
tered into agreements to arbitrate. 20 9  One need look no further that the
Wilko decision to see that as of 1953, the United States Supreme Court
agreed and understood that the limited vacatur grounds set forth in section
10 of the FAA did not eliminate a party's right to obtain vacatur under simi-
210lar circumstances. In support of its discussion of arbitration vacatur law
and the concept of manifest disregard, the Wilko majority cited The Hart-
bridge,2 1' a 1932 decision by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
203 See In re Williams, 4 Denio 194 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (discussing allegations that the arbitrators
exceeded and imperfectly executed their powers and noting both New York statutes and case law
that recognize those grounds for vacating an award).
204 See, e.g., The Indiana Cent. Ry. Co. v. Bradley, 7 Ind. 49 (1855) (applying an 1852 statute that
contains the following language, which is virtually identical to section 10 of the FAA: "That the ar-
bitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them that a final award on the subject matter
was not made").
205 See Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494, 497 (1902) ("Section 2374 provides that the court must make
an order vacating an award, where ... [the arbitrators] have exceeded their powers or imperfectly
executed them.").206 id.
207 id. at 496.
208 d.
209 See, e.g., Silver Refrigerator Mfg. Corp. v. Clementi, 99 N.Y.S.2d 767, 768-69 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Janet Shops, Inc. v. Tweens, Inc., 82 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Bond v. Shubert, 36
N.Y.S.2d 147, 154 (Sup.Ct. 1942), aff'd, In re Bond, 290 N.Y. 901 (1943).
210 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 437 (1953).
211 Wilko, 346 U.S. 437 n.24 (citing The Hartbridge (North of England S.S. Co.) v. Munson S.S.
Line, 62 F.2d 72,73 (2d Cir. 1932)).
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which the court discussed Wilkins and the "perverse misconstruction"
ground for vacating an award.
Nor is the "perverse misconstruction" standard unique to New York;
several states apply the principle that an arbitral award based on perverse
misconstruction is subject to vacatur and, more importantly, both state and
federal courts have equated the standard with manifest disregard of the
law.212 There is therefore little need to purport to dissect the phrase "per-
verse misconstruction." The phrase differs little from the concept of "gross
mistake" applied by the Supreme Court in Burchell or "manifest error" or
"palpable error." 2' What matters is that the state statutory law on which
section 10 of the FAA was modeled, and the traditional vacatur law that the
FAA was not intended to alter, separately and together allowed for at least
limited judicial review of arbitral awards for legal error. In the first few
years after the issuance of the Wilko opinion, courts both recognized this
fact214 and then even later were willing to concede that the Wilko manifest
disregard language might have been based on the "exceed powers" or "im-
perfectly executed powers" phraseology of section 10.215 It is not insignifi-
212 See, e.g., Flexible Mfr. Sys. Pty Ltd. v. Super Pords. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating
that the "approach to the scope of judicial review" announced in Wilko is "identical" to that of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court); City of Madison v. Madison Prof'l Police Officers Assoc., 425 N.W.2d
8, 11 (Wis. 1988) (stating it [the court] would "not overturn the arbitrator's decision for mere errors
of law or fact, but only when perverse misconstruction or positive misconduct [is] plainly estab-
lished, or if there is manifest disregard of the law"); Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, Local 530 v. Town
of Fairchild, 2005 WL 2857925, *5 (Conn. Sup. Oct. 14, 2005) ("Under the manifest disregard of
the law standard our Supreme Court has held that [a]bsent a showing of perverse misconstruction...
the arbitrator's decision is not subject to judicial inquiry") (quoting Clairol, Inc. v. Entertac Corp., 44
Conn. App. 506, 512 (1997), cert. denied, 241 Conn. 906 (1997)); Harris v. Bennet, 332 S.C. 238,
244-45 (Ct. App. 1998) (indicating that manifest disregard and perverse misconstruction are one and
the same standard).
213 Burehell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344 (1854).
214 See Gramling v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 853, 857 (W.D.S.C. 1957) ("[The
statutory grounds for vacating an award, 9 U.S.C. § 10, are substantially the same as those at com-
mon law.").
215 See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that section 1 0(a)(4) serves as the basis for the manifest disregard doctrine); I/S Stavborg v.
Nat'l Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[P]erhaps the rubric 'manifest dis-
regard' is after all not to be given independent significance; rather it is to be interpreted only in the
context of the specific narrow provisions of 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11."); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v.
Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 843
(1960); In re Sociedad Armadora Aristomenis Panama, 184 F. Supp. 738, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (ob-
serving that the Wilko Court "apparently rel[ied]" on the "exceeded their powers" language of sec-
tion 10(d) when it drafted the manifest disregard portion of the opinion); Metropolitan Waste Con-
trol Comm. v. City of Minnetonka, 242 N.W.2d 830, 832 (Minn. 1976) (equating manifest disregard
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cant to note that New York courts also have acknowledged repeatedly that
the "perverse misconstruction" standard is premised on the statutory provi-
sions that allow for vacatur of awards when arbitrators exceed their pow-
ers 216 and that irrational constructions of contractual provisions in dispute
"in effect, ma[kes] a new contract for the parties" and constitutes an act in
excess of arbitral powers.
2 17
C. Confusing Policy Objectives with Fortuitous Impacts
The fact that the legislative history of the FAA and its interrelationship
with traditional vacatur law has been all but ignored by courts and commen-
tators in this regard illustrates the risks of confusing the potential benefits of
arbitration with the policy objectives underlying the enforcement of agree-
ments to arbitrate. For good reason, courts frequently exalt the efficiencies
normally associated with the arbitration process.21 8 However, when courts
elevate the benefits of arbitration to the status of policy objective, they run
the risk of frustrating the FAA's goal of enforcing the parties' contractual
agreement to arbitrate. This propensity to both disregard the primacy of
policies favoring enforcement of party autonomy, and to place undue em-
phasis on the efficiencies attendant with arbitration is sufficiently common
to have caused the United States Supreme Court to unanimously observe in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd2 r9 that although efficiency is obviously a
desirable attribute of arbitration, it is not a policy objective under the
FAA. 220
The legislative history of the [FAA] establishes that the
purpose behind its passage was to ensure judicial enforce-
ment of privately made agreements to arbitrate. We there-
fore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the
Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution
of claims. The Act, after all, does not mandate the arbitra-
tion of all claims, but merely the enforcement-upon the
motion of one of the parties-of privately negotiated arbi-
tration agreements. The House Report accompanying the
to an act in excess of authority). For a partial list of commentators who suggest that the manifest
disregard standard is based on section 1 0(a)(4), see Scodro, supra note 11, at 604 n.250.
216 In re Sweeney, 1980 WL 27632, *3 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Dec. 22, 1980).
217 Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 8 N.Y.2d 377, 383 (1960).
218 See, e.g., Smoothline Ltd. v. North Am. Foreign Trading Corp., 249 F.3d 147, 148 (2d Cir. 2001)
(describing arbitration as "speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before specialists") (quoting Con-
ticommodity Serv. v. Phillip & Lion, 613 F.3d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980)); Ariz. Elec. Power Co-op.
Inc. v. Berkeley, 59 F.3d 988, 992 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that efficiency is the primary advantage of
arbitration).
219 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
220 Id.
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Act makes clear that its purpose was to place an arbitration
agreement "Von the same tooting as other contracts, where
it belongs," and to overrule thejudiciary's longstanding
refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. This is not to say
that Congress was blind to the potential benefit of the legis-
lation for expedited resolution of disputes....
Nonetheless, passage of the Act was motivated, first and
foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce agreements
into which parties had entered, and we must not overlook
this principal objective when construing the statute, or al-
low the fortuitous impact of the Act on efficient &4"pute
resolution to overshadow the underlying motivation.
That the Court unanimously supported these observations by quoting the
same 1924 statement by Representative Graham that is set forth above
223
only underscores the Court's insistence that the provisions of the FAA
should not be interpreted based on the premise that the FAA was designed to
further a supposed public policy favoring the efficient resolution of disputes.
The Supreme Court's unanimous statement in Byrd distinguishing be-
tween the FAA's policy objective of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and
the "fortuitous" fact that efficiencies might result from the enforcement of
such agreements, was sufficiently notable to have been acknowledged and
quoted by many federal courts over the years. 224 None of the many cases in
which courts have acknowledged and quoted this controlling principle, how-
ever, involve issues concerning the vacatur of arbitral awards or the scope of
review relating to awards. For reasons that seem to be related to the errone-
ous and unsubstantiated perception that in the name of efficiency, the FAA
eliminated the right of arbitrating parties' to agree to an arbitral adjudication
based on a correct application of the law, lower federal courts have all ig-
nored the Supreme Court's warning in Byrd that the intent of the FAA
22 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., Ist Sess., 1 (1924)).
222 Id. at 219 (emphasis added). See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947
(1995) (quoting the Byrd decision for the same proposition).
223 Id. at 219 n.7. See supra text accompanying note 198.
224 See, e.g., Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2004); Am.
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Rush v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 779 F.2d 885, 888 (2d Cir. 1985); Equinox Software Sys., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 1997 WL
570931, *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 1997); In re Interactive Video Res., Inc., 170 B.R. 716, 722 n.8 (S.D.
Fla. 1994); Torrence v. Murphy, 815 F. Supp. 965, 975 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Paine Webber, Inc. v.
Fowler, 791 F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Kan. 1992); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 761 F.
Supp. 472, 474 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff d, 951 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1991); Compuserve, Inc. v. Vigny
Int'l Fin. Ltd., 760 F. Supp. 1273, 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1990); In re Hemphill Bus Sales, Inc., 259 BR.
865, 869 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001); In re Chorus Data Sys., Inc., 122 B.R. 845, 850 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990).
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merely was to enforce agreements to arbitrate based on whatever the terms
of that agreement provide. 225 It thus is worthwhile to emphasize that the
Supreme Court's clear description in Byrd of the limited and narrow legisla-
tive intent of the FAA was not merely idle dicta to be ignored in favor of
ideological or dogmatic preferences. 226 Rather, and as the Supreme Court
has emphasized time and again, any correct understanding of the intent and
operation of the FAA must be based in part on a recognition that the
achievement of efficiencies is irrelevant to determining Congress' intent in
passing the FAA:
After all, the basic objective in this area is not to resolve
disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what
the parties' wishes, Dean Witter Reynolds, supra, at 219-
20, 105 S.Ct., at 1241-1242, but to ensure that commercial
arbitration agreements, like other contracts, " 'are enforced
according to their terms,' " Mastrobuono, 514 U.S., at 54,
115 S.Ct., at 1214 (quoting Volt Information Sciences, 489
U.S., at 479, 109 S.Ct., at 1256), and according to the in-
tentions of the parties, Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S., at 626,
105 S.Ct., at A453. See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S., at 271, 115
S.Ct., at 838.
There is nothing in the legislative history of the FAA to suggest that, in
addition to the primary policy objective of the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate, the FAA promoted an utterly contradictory exception to that policy
whereby any contractual expectation that an arbitral tribunal would correctly
apply the law would be deemed unenforceable under the FAA. A correct
interpretation of the provisions of the FAA must be based on the premise
that the FAA was designed to permit parties to delineate the nature of the
arbitration process to which they could agree and to allow the courts to then
enforce that contractual agreement. It was presumably for this reason that
the Wilko Court saw no contradiction in relying on both the FAA and tradi-
tional American vacatur law when it observed that "it may be true... that a
failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the provisions of the
Securities Act would 'constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to
section 10 of the [FAA]."' 228
225 See, e.g., MacTek Inc. v. Gorelick, 427 F.3d 821, 829 (10th Cir. 2005) (observing that the funda-
mental purpose of the FAA "is to reduce litigation costs by providing a more efficient forum" and
stating that "it makes sense to uphold contractual provisions that support that aim while striking
down provisions that subvert it"); Sevenson Envtl Serv. v. Sapp Battery Site, 2004 WL 936764, No.
04 Civ. 0670JFK, *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 29, 2004) ("In order to prevent the twin goals of arbitration--
efficient dispute resolution and avoidance of long and costly litigation--from being undermined, ju-
dicial review of arbitration awards is severely limited and narrow in scope.").
226 Byrd, 470 U.S. at 214.
227 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995).
22 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)).
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D. On the Eve of Wilko v. Swan
Another indication that the enactment of the FAA did not result in a
radical change in arbitration vacatur law is the fact that the advent of the
FAA was not immediately followed by a wholesale judicial abandonment of
previously existing vacatur law. To be sure, there were those courts that
seemed to be uncertain whether the FAA had altered prior law, but even
those courts refrained from holding that it did. One example of that reluc-
tance is found in the 1932 opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in The Hartbridge, in which the court openly struggled to recon-
cile section 10 of the FAA, Burchell, and the decision of the New York
Court of Appeals in Wilkins.23 0 The state court's decision in Wilkins23' was
directly relevant to the Second Circuit's analysis of the case because the ap-
pellant relied on Wilkins as support for the proposition that an award could
be vacated due to "perverse misconstruction" 232 and presumably because the
Wilkins court's holding in this regard pertained to a New York arbitration
vacatur statute that contained essentially the same grounds for vacating an233
award as those contained in Section 10 of the FAA. With some hesita-
tion, the Second Circuit therefore reviewed the award to determine if it con-
tained the alleged legal error; when the court found that no such error had
occurred, it stated that the underlying facts and law "would seem to justify
the award, if, indeed, justification were necessary." 234 Based on these de-
terminations, the court, relying on Burchell and other cases, then held that
the arbitrators did not exceed their authority or otherwise act impartially and
that the award was thus final and binding.
5
The decision by the court of appeals in Hartbridge is sufficiently vague
that it is difficult to argue that it has any single meaning. Nevertheless, the
Wilko Court cited Hartbridge in its footnote 24, along with Kleine, Burchell,
229 The Hartbridge (North of England S.S. Co. Ltd.) v. Munson S.S. Line, 62 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1932),
cert. denied, 288 U.S. 601 (1933).
230 See id. at 73.
231 Wilkins v. Allen, 169 N.Y. 494 (1902).
232 See The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d at 73.
233 See Wilkins, 169 N.Y. at 497 (discussing section 2374 of the New York Revised Statutes, which
the court stated "provides that the court must make an order vacating an award, where it is procured
by corruption, fraud or undue means, where the arbitrators are partial or corrupt, or guilty of mis-
conduct or other misbehavior which prejudiced the rights of any party, or where they have exceeded
their powers or imperfectly executed them").
4 The Hartbridge, 62 F.2d at 73.
235 id.
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Farragut, and other authorities, as supporting its observations regarding
236
manifest disregard. In view of the clear meaning of those other decisions,
the Court's reference to Hartbridge is best interpreted to mean that the Wilko
Court generally agreed with the principles affirmed in Wilkins and consid-
ered by the court of appeals in Hartbridge.
On the eve of the Wilko decision, other courts also suggested that statu-
tory language such as that contained in Section 10 of the FAA could not be
read to mean that courts were never empowered to vacate arbitral awards for
legal error. For example, in Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 237 a Cali-
fornia district court of appeal considered a state vacatur statute that con-
tained virtually the same language of section 10.238 In discussing the opera-
tion and intent of the California statute, and relying on a long series of
decisions by California courts, the court applied all of the same arbitration
vacatur principles previously discussed in this article pertaining to unre-
stricted submissions, including (1) the arbitrators' right under an unrestricted
submission to ignore the law and (2) the rule that awards issued under an un-
restricted submission can be vacated for gross error or mistake apparent on
239the face of the award. Virtually contemporaneously, in Mancusco v. L.
Gillarde Co., the Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
240
not only acknowledged the applicability of the gross mistake standard ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in Burchell but also further emphasized that in
the "later [Farragut] decision" the Supreme Court "laid down the.., rule"
that an award based on a mistake relating to a concrete proposition of law or
a manifest mistake of law may be set aside. 24 1 Two years later, the Mary-
land Supreme Court provided a helpful analysis of these principles in
Schreiber v. Pacific Coast Fire Ins. Co. 2 42 In emphasizing that errors that
impede the arbitrators' ability to exercise their judgment are reversible, the
court stated that:
When it is sought to set aside an award, upon the ground of
a mistake committed by arbitrators, it is not sufficient to
show that they came to a conclusion of fact erroneously,
236 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 n.24.
237 Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 188 P.2d 60 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948), vacated on other
grounds, 204 P.2d 37 (Cal. 1949).
238 Id. at 62. The court cited to section 1288 of the California Civil Code of Procedure to substanti-
ate this point, claiming that it contained the same grounds for vacating awards as is set forth in sec-
tion 10 of the FAA). Id. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10. However, as of the time of the publication of this
article, the standards for vacatur of award are located in section 1286.2, as amended in 2001. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 2002).
239 Franklin, 188 P.2d at 62-63.
240 See Mancusco v. L. Gillarde Co., 61 A.2d 677 (D.C. 1948).
241 Id. at 678-80.
242 See Schreiber v. Pac. Coast Fire Ins. Co., 75 A.2d 108, 112-13 (1950).
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however clearly it may be demonstrated that the inference
drawn by them was wrong. It must be shown that, by some
error, they were so misled or deceived that they did not ap-
ply the rules which they intended to a pply to the decision of
the case, so that upon their own theory, a mistake was
made which has caused the result to be somewhat different
from that24hich they had reached by their reason andjudgment.
Twenty-five years after the passage of the FAA, and as of the midpoint
of the twentieth century, American vacatur law still seemed to stand on a
reasonably firm foundation that, at a minimum, permitted judicial review of
arbitral awards for legal error at least under limited circumstances. The
topic drew the attention of a Harvard law student who authored an article on
the subjectZ44-a worthy enough deed in its own right, but one hardly worth
mentioning were it not for the fact that the Wilko Court perceived that the
article further supported its manifest disregard statement and thus included it
in its list of authorities in footnote 24.245 The student article was laden with
citations reflecting the diverse manner in which various state courts had ap-
plied vacatur law, with the result that there was no agreement on the exact
246
application of that law or the full extent of its nuances and exceptions.
Nevertheless, in the very next section of the article cited by the Wilko
Court,247 the author plainly stated that even in jurisdictions that had more
conservative vacatur laws, awards entered in those jurisdictions could be va-
cated when the arbitrator "made a logical error in applying his own princi-
ple. ' 248 Perhaps more significantly, the author observed that when the par-
ties' arbitration agreement contains a restriction to the effect that the
arbitrators should decide the issues according to a "specific standard" or, al-
ternatively, a choice of law provision requiring the application of the law of
a particular jurisdiction, then "[t]he courts generally-even in those jurisdic-
243 Schreiber, 75 A.2d at 112 (quoting 5 C.J. 179) (emphasis added).
244 See Note, Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards on the Merits, 63 HARV. L. REv. 681 (1950).
245 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437 n.24.
246 See Note, supra note 244, at 685-87.
247 Id. at 687. The Court's "jump cite" to the Harvard article actually references only page 685, but it
seems clear that the Court meant to reference multiple pages beginning with the discussion that
commenced at that page-entitled "Award Based on Erroneous Rule"-because that discussion con-
tinues on for several pages and has no logical breaking point anywhere in its text. See Note, supra
note 244, at 685-87.
248 Id. at 687.
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tions which otherwise strictly limit review on the merits-are quick to upset
an award which does not conform to the stipulation.
'
"
249
While at least two arbitration scholars have attempted to discredit the
legitimacy of the student author's analysis and thereby impeach the Wilko
Court's reliance on the article, 25 the fact remains that the student article is
generally consistent with a century and a half of arbitration jurisprudence. It
was no doubt for that reason that the United States Supreme Court relied on
the article when it pronounced its understanding of the law in Wilko. It was
presumably for the same reason that the Wilko Court also cited Professor
Wesley Sturges' 1930 arbitration treatise in its footnote 24. As Professor
Sturgis noted, under the prevailing law as of 1930, an award was subject to
vacatur when the arbitrators "undertook to decide according to law but
missed.
, 251
The entirety of the above discussion relating to traditional American va-
catur law and the legislative history of the FAA is to be contrasted with a
particularly revealing statement made by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Termi-
nals Ltd.,252 the first decision to describe the perceived arameters of the
contemporary doctrine of manifest disregard of the law. 3 It has already
been noted that the San Martine decision selectively relied on, and incor-
rectly read, the Supreme Court's 1854 decision in Burchell when it arrived at
its unique-and now widely accepted---extrapolation of the meaning of the
254Wilko majority's manifest disregard language. The Ninth Circuit's con-
249 Id. at 688.
250 See Scodro, supra note 11, at 584-85; Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and
the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT'L L. J. 449, 522-23 n.299 (2005). Professor Rau asserts that the
Wilko Court should not have relied on the article in support of its manifest disregard discussion be-
cause the article "says nothing of the kind--concluding merely that 'the general view, both at com-
mon law and by statute, is that the courts will not review for its wisdom or soundness the principle
selected by the arbitrator' in the absence of some explicit limitation on his power." Id. n.299 (quot-
ing 63 HARv. L. REv. at 685). Professor Rau adds that he was unable to "find even the slightest
trace of the paternity of th[e] phrase [manifest disregard] in any context remotely related to arbitra-
tion." 50 TEX. INT'L LAW J. at 522. He, thus, further concludes that if the phrase "ever appeared in
the cases before Wilko, it was as a mere catchphrase trotted out in a hodgepodge of entirely alien
settings-sometimes to suggest a highly restrictive standard of scrutiny, sometimes as a rhetorical
flourish at the moment of overturning a jury verdict or the judgment of some other inferior tribunal."
dat 522 (citing several decisions not pertaining to arbitration law and awards). It is to be hoped that
the present article, at the very minimum, serves to show that there is a clear and demonstrable pater-
nity to the phrase "manifest disregard" and that those origins preceded the Wilko decision by many
decades.
251 See Scodro, supra note 11, at 584 (quoting WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION & AWARDS 500-02 (1930)).
252 293 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1961).
253 See supra note 69.
254 Id.
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cluding remarks in this regard are particularly significant since they show
why a complete analysis and understanding of traditional vacatur law and
the legislative history of the FAA should lead only to the conclusion that in
passing the FAA, Congress did not intend to alter existing vacatur law. Spe-
cifically, the Ninth Circuit stated as follows:
It is inconceivable that in enacting these sections [10 and
11 of the FAA] Congress was unaware of the rule of
Burchell v. Marsl, supra, to the effect that a court will not
set aside a decision of the arbitrators for error either in law
or fact. Had Congress contemplated that any different rule
should now become operative, or that a mere error of law
should be a basis for setting aside an award, it would have
had no difficulty in drafting a sepaie subdivision of sec-
tions 10 or 11 which would say that.
The extraordinary irony of this statement should be apparent. For good
reason, the court in San Martine charged Congress with the knowledge of
existing vacatur law and then vigorously asserted that if Congress had in-
tended to change that law in the course of passing the FAA it "would have
had no difficulty in drafting a separate subdivision.., which would say
that." Given the extraordinary nature of the Supreme Court's 1875 decision
in Farragut, however, and the much more obscure nature of the Court's
1854 decision in Burchell, it is fair to observe that it is all but "inconceiv-
able" that Congress was not aware of the Farragut opinion, as well as the
many other cases discussed here relating to traditional vacatur law. More-
over, in interpreting the FAA, it should be presumed that Congress was
aware not only of existing law but also of the correct application of that law,
such that Congress would have known that Burchell stood for a far different
proposition than suggested in San Martine. As a result, and applying the
San Martine court's observations regarding the manner in which Congress
drafts and passes legislation, one can only conclude that had Congress in-
tended to alter the principles established in those many cases-including but
not limited to Burchell and Farragut-that allow for the vacatur of arbitral
awards based on clear errors in the application of established law, Congress
would have done so through specific legislative enactment that clearly al-
tered that law.
We, of course, know from the statements of the congressional sponsors
of the FAA that the FAA did "not involve any new principle of law[]...
create[d] no new legislation, [and] grant/ed] no new rights, except a rem-
255 San Martine, 293 F.2d at 802.
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edy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty con-
tracts.' 256 It was for these very reasons-i.e., that Congress (1) was well
aware of the rule that permitted vacatur of awards for clear errors in legal
reasoning and (2) had no intention of changing that law-that section 10 of
the FAA simply reiterated long-standing principles relating to traditional va-
catur law and did not alter or embellish them. Without realizing it, the court
in San Martine not only showed why its own construction of the Wilko
court's manifest disregard language was incorrect but also provided yet an-
other reason for concluding that in passing the FAA, the Congress did not
intend to impose new limitations on the courts' authority to review arbitral
awards for legal error.
V. REEXAMINING THE WILKO OPINION
The preceding discussion of traditional American arbitration vacatur law
and the legislative history of the FAA illustrates that there is ample reason to
analyze the Wilko decision in light of that law and history. From that discus-
sion it should be obvious that in their efforts to apply Wilko's admonition
regarding manifest disregard, lower courts were, and continue to be, wrong
in concluding that the Wilko Court's manifest disregard language repre-
sented newly anointed, "judicially made" law. It should be just as obvious
that in its attempt to apply traditional American arbitration law, the Wilko
Court confused one principle and slightly rephrased another, thereby giving
rise to the confusion that has perpetuated to this day. It is therefore time to
reassess Wilko to show how the Court's opinion incorrectly described the
operation of traditional vacatur law as well as why the commonly accepted
interpretation of Wilko is dramatically in error.
A. The Meaning of "Disregard"
It has been primarily for ideological reasons-associated with the mis-
perception that the prevailing public policy underlying the enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate is to achieve "efficiencies" in alternative dispute
resolution-that courts continually have concluded that in using the word
"disregard" in Wilko, the Supreme Court could have only meant to describe
an intentional act by arbitrators. Federal courts therefore uniformly hold
that for the manifest disregard doctrine to apply, the arbitrators must be
aware of the operation of applicable law and then intentionally elect not to
256 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added); see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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apply that law.257 In so doing, federal courts not only fail to consider the
historical context that preceded Wilko but also seemingly ignore the fact that
common definitions of the word "disregard" are not limited in a fashion that
exclusively requires scienter. In different recognized dictionaries, the word
"disregard"-which can be either a noun or a verb-is variously defined to
characterize a circumstance in which the actor gives no thought to, or pays
no attention to something 258 or treats something without proper respect or
attentiveness 254 or with a lack of consideration or respect.R6 These defini-
tions, which do not require that the actor knowingly ignore the subject mat-
ter and, instead, require only that the actor fails to lend due attention to the
subject matter, are sufficiently common enough that some courts have
quoted them and then, without explanation, have ignored them.
26 1
In any event, the best illustration that it is unnecessary for a party or a
court to be aware of a law, and then ignore it, in order to be charged with
"disregarding" that law, is the fact that courts, with sufficient regularity, use
the word "disregard" in a variety of contexts in which the limiting condition
of scienter has no application. For example, in Lawlor v. National Screen
Service Corp.,262 which was decided only a few years after Wilko, Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justices Burton and Harlan, issued a dissenting opin-
ion in which he discussed the circumstance in which a lower federal court
"challengingly or ignorantly disregards the controlling law as set forth by
[the Supreme] Court. 26 3  Justice Frankfurter's 1957 acknowledgement in
Lawlor that a party could disregard something both intentionally (i.e., "chal-
lengingly") and unintentionally (i.e., "ignorantly") sheds light on how Jus-
tice Frankfurter understood the word "disregard" was being used by the
Wilko majority. It is consistent to conclude that when Justice Frankfurter
authored his dissenting opinion only four years earlier in Wilko and stated
that, "[a]rbitrators may not disregard the law... [and instead are] 'bound to
257 See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 48-49 (Ala. 2004); see also Hayford, supra
note 7, at 764-78 (providing a survey of manifest disregard cases through 1996).
258 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (3d ed. 1986).
259 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000) (also defin-
ing the noun "disregard" to mean the "[1]ack of thoughtful attention or due regard").
260 CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (2006).
261 See, e.g., Birmingham News, 901 So. 2d at 51 (quoting Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,
128 F.3d 1456, 1461-62 (11 th Cir. 1997)).
262 352 U.S. 992 (1957).
263 Id. at 995 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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decide in accordance with the [law]' 264 and that "their failure to observe
the law 'would ... constitute grounds for vacating the award,"' 265 he meant
that any failure, whether intentional or unintentional, to properly observe or
decide in accordance with the law was equivalent to a disregard of the law.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has referred to instances in which there occurs
an "intentional disregard of such laws" 266 and, alternatively, to instances in
which a "negligent disregard of the laws" occurs. 26 7 Other courts have ac-
knowledged that a law may be "unintentionally" disregarded.268 Modem tax
law even recognizes two separate forms of claims--one maintainable against
the IRS and the other against the taxpayer-for "negligent disregard of the
law."
269
Many cases that preceded Wilko, including Kleine, Burchell, and Farra-
gut, recognized that "manifest" or "gross" or clear mistakes or errors in legal
reasoning could be remedied upon judicial review of an arbitral award.
Those cases did not require that the error be occasioned by an intentional,
overt act by which the arbitrator knew the correct application of the law and
then intentionally proceeded to ignore it. In fact, those decisions presumed
precisely the opposite-that the arbitrators' manifest error was inadvertent
such that the arbitrators would have corrected their decision had they been
aware of the error. 27  There is absolutely no reason to believe that when the
Wilko Court cited those cases in its footnote 24 and then used the term disre-
gard instead of mistake, the Court intended both to alter the meaning of
those cases and to create an entirely new legal doctrine that narrowly ad-
dressed intentional acts by arbitrators in derogation of clearly known, exist-
ing law. Rather, the more logical conclusion is that when the Wilko Court
employed the word disregard, it meant for the word to be inclusive such that
264 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Wilko v. Swan,
201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953)).
265 Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439,
445 (2d Cit. 1953)).
266 United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 251 U.S. 128, 134 (1919) (emphasis added).
267 Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 545 (1918) (emphasis added) (distinguishing between "will-
ful" and "negligent" disregard of law). See also Mobile, Jackson, & Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Missis-
sippi, 210 U.S. 187, 190 (1908) (describing an allegation that a party was guilty of"willful disregard
of the law").
268 See Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing both "inten-
tional or unintentional disregard of the law").
269 Fenceroy v. I.R.S., 153 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2001). Compare Fenceroy, 153 F. Supp.
2d. at 899 (recognizing a cause of action against the IRS for "negligent disregard of the law") with
Lund v. Comm'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 599 (2000), affd, 40 Fed. Appx. 592 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
that as a result of having "negligently disregarded the tax law," a party was liable for "accuracy-
related penalties").
270 See supra Part II.
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it would be broadly defined to describe the circumstance in which the actor
fails to give due consideration to a clearly established principle of law.
B. The Distinction Between Error in Interpretation and Manifest Disregard
Admittedly, on a colloquial level, the distinction between an error in the
interpretation of a law and an error in the application of a law is not easy to
perceive. The Wilko Court did not, however, create the distinction; the dis-
tinction existed for many decades prior to the issuance of the Wilko opinion
and has been amply discussed here. Without unnecessarily revisiting the
numerous instances in which courts-including those that decided White
271 272Mountains Railroad v. Beane and Sanborn v. Murphy -- distinguished
between the circumstance in which the law was sufficiently clear and estab-
lished such that there was no need for an "interpretation" by the arbitrator
and the very different circumstance in which "there was room for discussion,
and for much diversity of opinion" regarding the operation of the law,273 it
must be emphasized that the distinction is easily reconcilable both with a
policy of deference to the decisions of arbitral tribunals and also a policy
that seeks to enforce the contracting parties' expectations.
In the instance in which there is room for a difference of opinion regard-
ing the operation of a law that is ambiguous or amenable to more than one
interpretation, the principle articulated in not only Wilko but also the many
other cases discussed in this article ensures that complete deference is
granted to the subjective decision of the arbitral tribunal. In contrast, when
the tribunal plainly errs in the application of clearly established, incontro-
vertible law, there is no policy objective that is served by "deferring" to the
tribunal's erroneous application of that law; the law and the parties both as-
sume that it is the intention of the tribunal to correctly apply that law and
that the parties' contractual rights will be determined not by some erroneous
construction of that law but by the law as it stands. To hold otherwise is to
suggest that when parties enter into an arbitration agreement that calls for
the application of a particular law, they agree that the arbitrator can make the
most blatant mistakes in the application of clearly established law such that
their rights-conceivably including ongoing rights in a long-term contract-
271 See White Mountains R.R. v. Beane, 39 N.H. 107 (1859).
272 See Sanborn v. Murphy, 50 N.H. 65 (1870).
273 White Mountains, 39 N.H. at 108. See also Brodhead-Garrett Co. v. Davis Lumber Co., 124 S.E.
600, 602 (W. Va. 1924) (stating that if the arbitrators "mistake the law on a doubtful point [the
award) will not be disturbed").
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can legitimately be forever altered by an arbitral ruling based on a funda-
mental legal error that is plainly demonstrable. There is nothing in the legis-
lative history of the FAA to support such a result; rather, the preexisting case
law, which the FAA endorsed, illustrates that the law logically does not con-
template that parties to arbitration agreements typically and intentionally
seek to grant arbitral tribunals the latitude to undermine their contractual
rights when they are clearly determined by established legal principles. It is
for that very reason that New York law, on which the FAA was based, rec-
ognizes that awards founded on a "perverse construction" of a contract may
be vacated 274 and why New York courts have equated such a perverse mis-
construction with arbitral acts in excess of authority because they, in es-
sence, create "a new contract."
275
For these reasons, the Wilko majority, the dissenting Justices in Wilko,
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the decision below all
harmoniously refrained from suggesting that an arbitral award could never
276be reviewed for legal error. As was true with respect to the Wilko Court's
use of the word "disregard," every federal circuit and many state courts have
misconstrued the meaning and significance of the Wilko Court's reference to
"interpretations of the law" when it said that "interpretations of the law by
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation."' 277
C. Confusing Unrestricted and Restricted Submissions
Having succeeded in correctly stating the operation of two aspects of
traditional American arbitration vacatur law, it is disappointing that the
Wilko Court would struggle, and fail, to properly articulate the operation of
the third aspect relating to the distinction between restricted and unrestricted
submissions. After all, the Court had identified at least one of the main
cases that discussed the distinction-Kleine-and obviously was aware that
the distinction existed. Yet it is clear that the Court did confuse the two
concepts. The catalyst for that error appears to be the unfounded supposition
that to determine whether there are any restrictions on the scope of the arbi-
tral tribunals' authority, an arbitration provision contained within a contract
must be examined in utter isolation without giving consideration to other
274 Bd. of Educ. v. Dover-Wingdale Teachers' Ass'n, 467 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983),
aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 913 (1984); Civil Serv. Employee's Ass'n, Inc. v. County of Niagara, 427 N.Y.S.2d
131, 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
275 See Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305 (N.Y. 1960).
276 See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
277 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
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significant contractual provisions, particularly including a choice of law
clause.
It is difficult to comprehend a material difference between a contract
that contains separate choice of law and arbitration provisions and a contract
containing an arbitration provision that states that the arbitrators shall apply
a particular law in resolving any disputes between the parties. In the former
circumstance, the parties have memorialized an agreement that a particular
law will determine their rights and obligations and that an arbitral tribunal
will adjudicate disputes regarding those rights and obligations; in the latter
circumstance, the parties have agreed to precisely the same principle. To
suggest that in the former circumstance the tribunal is not required to apply
the law specified in the separate choice of law provision results in a com-
plete emasculation of the choice of law provision and the negation of the
parties' contractual expectations. This point is sufficiently sound that it has
been recognized by at least one federal appellate court.
2 78
In Wilko, the parties' contract contained a separate choice of law provi-
sion acknowledging that their transaction "shall be subject to the provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and present and future acts amenda-
tory thereto." 279  Although the choice of law provision did not explicitly
mention the Securities Act of 1933, the Wilko Court nonetheless suggested it
was probable that the intent of the provision was to include the Act.280 In
contrast, the separate arbitration provision of the agreement simply specified
the procedural rules and arbitration statute under which any arbitration
would be conducted. 2 1 The choice of law provision clearly acknowledged
the applicability of the securities laws. However, the Wilko majority con-
cluded that the parties' contract did not specifically require the arbitral tribu-
nal to apply the securities law in resolving any disputes between the parties.
Indeed, the Court was steadfast with its decision even after the respondent
agreed that the arbitration provision did not eliminate the applicability of
those provisions of the Securities Act relating to liability or burden of
278 George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 579 (7th Cir. 2001). Ironically, the
acknowledgement of this principle was made in the context of the application of the manifest disre-
gard of the law doctrine. Id. The court in George Watts observed, by way of offering an example of
the application of the doctrine, that if the parties' contract specifies that Wisconsin law will apply
and the arbitrator "declar[es] he prefers New York law," then the ensuing award may be vacated
under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA. Id.
279 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434.
280 id.
211 ld. at 432 n. 15.
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proof.282 In the end, however, and because of the mandatory nature of the
securities laws, the Court was reluctantly forced to concede that the "trans-
action would necessarily be subject to [the Securities Act of 1934] ' ,283 and
the Court of Appeals and the respondent were both correct in concluding
that "in so far as the award in arbitration may be affected by legal require-
ments, statutes or common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the
provisions of the Securities Act control. 284
Due both to the explicit provisions of the parties' contract and the
Court's view that the mandatory protections of the securities law could not
be waived in a predispute arbitration agreement, the parties' arbitration
agreement should have been viewed as being "restricted" in nature. The ar-
bitral tribunal was not free to determine a dispute between the parties with-
out applying the securities laws. The Court of Appeals, therefore reasoned
that, "the agreement in the case at bar is 'subject to' the 1933 Act; conse-
quently the arbitrators are bound to decide in accordance with the provisions
of section 12(2). ' '285
In its effort to determine whether to refuse to compel arbitration of the
petitioner's securities claims, the Wilko majority attempted to explain exist-
ing vacatur law and, it is here that the manifest disregard language is found.
The discussion was meant to show that judicial review of arbitral awards
was more limited than judicial review of district court judgments, a long-
established principle that Kleine, Burchell, Farragut, and other cases show
has always been the rule in American arbitration law. The Court therefore
correctly cited those cases as support for its reasoning and its comments re-
garding manifest disregard. The Court plainly erred, however, in suggesting
that the arbitration agreement in the case before it was an "unrestricted"
submission and then compounded that error by suggesting that when arbitra-
tors acting under an unrestricted submission "manifestly disregard" the law,
the resulting award is subject to vacatur. Under the very cases cited by the
Wilko Court, arbitrators acting under an unrestricted submission are free to
manifestly and knowingly disregard the law should they elect to resolve the
dispute in a different manner.
Had the Wilko majority correctly stated the pertinent law as it applied to
the case at bar, it would have stated something to the effect that "under a re-
stricted submission that requires the arbitrators to apply a particular law, the
subjective interpretations of the arbitrators in contrast to manifest mistake in
the application of clearly established law are not subject, in federal courts, to
282 Id. at 433-34 (stating "this proposed agreement has no requirement that the arbitrators follow the
law").283 Id. at 434 n. 18.
"4 Id. at 433-34, 434 n.18.
285 Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
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judicial review for error in interpretation." In hindsight, the Wilko major-
ity's observations regarding manifest disregard of the law were not far re-
moved from being accurate. In the event, the Court's misdescription of the
arbitration provisions as being "unrestricted," together with the Court's use
of the word "disregard" as a synonym for "mistake," 286 have given rise vi-
cariously to an illegitimate legal doctrine , recognized by every federal cir-
cuit, that thwarts the primary objective of the FAA and leaves parties with-
out a legal remedy for clearly demonstrable errors in the application of
definitively established law.
VI. REVITALIZING PARTY AUTONOMY
After the passage of more than fifty years since the issuance of the
Wilko opinion, it is difficult to be sanguine about the possibility that the
United States Supreme Court, or one or more federal circuit courts, will
come to the realization that it was not Congress' intention in passing the
FAA to negate that aspect of traditional American vacatur law that permitted
judicial review of arbitral awards for clear error in the application of estab-
lished law. As Justice O'Conner observed in 1995 in Allied-Bruce Terminix
Companies, Inc. v. Dobson,287 "the Court has abandoned all pretense of as-
certaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act,
building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation." 288 There is
little in Supreme Court jurisprudence to suggest that the Court is willing to
reverse that practice. If anything, admonitions by lower courts against par-
ties seeking judicial review on the basis of legal error--even when based on
the manifest disregard doctrine-have become increasingly shrill and insis-
tent,289 signaling a heightened reluctance to consider issues relating to the
intent of the FAA and chilling the voices of those who otherwise might ar-
gue for a judicial reconsideration of misguided interpretations of the FAA.
286 It is noteworthy in this regard that one prominent dictionary states that the synonym for "disre-
gard" is "neglect," a word that allows for unintentional acts such as those committed through negli-
gence, and that is thus far broader than the narrow construction placed on the word "disregard" by
the many courts that have attempted to apply Wilko. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (3d. 1986).
287 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
288 Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a particularly scholarly and aggressive discussion of the
Supreme Court's propensity in this regard, see MACNEIL, supra note 190, at 170-76.
289 See, e.g., B.L. Harbert Int'l LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006) (threaten-
ing, in a lengthy discourse, to issue severe sanctions against parties and their counsel who, without
sufficient basis, seek vacatur on the ground of manifest disregard).
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This probability of a permanent entrenchment by not only the courts, but
also Congress, with respect to the generally accepted interpretation of sec-
tion 10 of the FAA, has been further supported by institutional influences
that, in essence, lobby against any legislative amendment to the FAA even
when such an amendment might be designed to clarify the original intent of
Congress. 
290
On the other hand, there are subtle indications that the judiciary, arbitra-
tion practitioners, and arbitral institutions are struggling to reconcile the dual
propositions (1) that courts are not empowered to enforce an arbitration
agreement that requires the arbitrators to correctly apply the law and (2) that
courts cannot rectify manifest errors in the application of law to ensure that
the true intent of the arbitrators is effectuated. Perhaps the best illustration
of this philosophical discomfort is that some federal circuits uphold the en-
forceability of so-called enhanced review clauses,291  under which parties
purport to agree to alter the force and effect of Section 10 of the FAA by
specifically providing for merits-based judicial review of an arbitral award.
Similarly, and on a seemingly ad hoc basis, courts at various times have held
that an award may be vacated when the award is "arbitrary and capri-
cious, '292 "completely irrational," 293 or fails to "draw its essence" from the
294parties' contract. The doctrine offunctus officio, under which arbitrators
are precluded from correcting their own errors in the application of law, is
290 See, e.g., John M. Townsend, The Federal Arbitration Act is too Important to Amend, 4(2) INT'L
ARB. NEWS 19, 21 (2004). Mr. Townsend, a Washington, D.C. attorney and member of the Board of
Directors and chairperson of the Executive Committee of the American Arbitration Association, as-
serted that to the extent there are any deficiencies in the FAA, they are adequately compensated by
evolving arbitration jurisprudence, which Mr. Townsend stated has accorded to the FAA "a widely
accepted and relied-upon set of meanings," and that any effort to amend the FAA, "however well
intentioned, . . . will have the effect of opening the statute to other amendments that may have radi-
cally different objectives." Id.
29 Compare Harris v. Parker College of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 794 (5th Cir. 2002) (reasoning
that parties may contractually agree to a specific standard of review in their arbitration provisions)
with UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1998) (questioning
whether expanded review clauses are enforceable). See generally Kenneth M. Curtin, An Examina-
tion of Contractual Expansion and Limitation of Juicial Review ofArbitral Awards, 15 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 337 (2000); Stephen J. Ware, "Opt-in "for Judicial Review of Errors of Law Under
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 263 (1997).
292 See, e.g., Drummon Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 748 F.2d 1495, 1497 (11 th Cir. 1984);
Lifecare Int'l Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 435 (11 th Cir. 1995) (observing that the "arbi-
trary and capricious" exception is "a very difficult standard for the party contesting the arbitration
award to overcome" and that for the exception to apply, "the Panel's award must contain more than
an error of law or interpretation").
293 French v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 1986).
294 Anderman/Smith Operating Co. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 918 F.2d 1215, 1218 (5th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991) (holding "the award must, in some logical way, be derived from
the wording or purpose of the contract").
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also coming under increasing attack by both commentators and courts.295
And even arbitral institutions 296 and individual arbitrators 297 strive to find
ways to mitigate the consequences that attend arbitral awards infected by er-
rors in legal analysis. These developments must be seen as providing only a
disjointed and moderating affect on what has truly been a judicial and insti-
tutional campaign against merits-based judicial review of awards.
Ultimately, it must be recognized that contemporary American arbitra-
tion law, and the illegitimate birth of the manifest disregard of the law doc-
trine, have given rise to an extraordinary circumstance in which a nonlegis-
lated and undeclared policy prohibits parties from entering into an
enforceable arbitration provision that provides that any contractual disputes
will be resolved through a correct application of the law. In the totality of
American civil law, no other circumstance exists in which the judiciary has
concluded that it will not and cannot enforce such a benign and commer-
298
cially valid objective. As a result, and until the status quo is altered, par-
ties to commercial contracts must realize that the FAA does not purport to
ensure an alternative system of justice. Instead, the FAA, as applied by the
courts, merely fosters an alternative system of dispute resolution in which
the assurance of a just result has been made subservient to a judicially im-
posed objective of expediency.
293 See supra note 51. It is notable that the codification of the functus officio doctrine in the FAA
recognizes that the purpose of the doctrine is to "effect the intent" of the award. See 9 U.S.C. § 11.
The same principle serves as the basis for the traditional rule that awards based on clear errors in the
application of law may be vacated. See supra Part 11.
296 See, e.g., CPR International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Arbitration Appeal
Procedure, http://www.cpradr.org/adrscrn.asp?M=9.1 (last visited May 21, 2006).
297 See Gaitis, supra note I, at 92 n.371-72.
298 Ironically, in the international commercial arena, contracting parties can easily circumvent a par-
ticular nation's aversion to the judicial review of arbitral awards simply by agreeing to the lex arbitri
of a nation that does permit such review. See Park, supra note 13, at 12.
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